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III Sununary of  main findings 
This report sets out the findings of a study concerned with the ways in which projects 
sponsored by the EC Framework Programme are approached and managed by finns and 
the factors that affect the exploitation of their results. 
1. Introduction 
The background to the study lies in the prevalent thesis that the competitiveness of 
European finns is related to their efficiency and effectiveness in exploiting the results of 
R&D.  1\vo issues  are  put forward  under this thesis.  The fll'St  relates to the R&D 
management patterns prevailing in  Europe, as opposed to those in  other parts of  the world. 
The second concerns the impact of  the EC Framework Programme on  the ability of  finns 
to exploit results of EC Framework Programme projects. 
The two issues  are linked.  At one level, the management of the R&D  process is 
intimately elated to the ability to exploit its results. At a more basic level there is a 
relationship between the fundamental mission of EC R&D to promote Europe's industrial 
competitiveness, and the creativity and innovativeness of European firms. 
These relationships define the object of  this study, which focused on  the ways in  which 
firms manage the R&D process and the exploitation of its results, as much through their 
own initiatives as through EC sponsored projects. 
2. Methodology 
The findings are based on 41 interviews carried out in Germany, the UK, France, Italy, 
Denmark Belgium, the Netherlands, Greece, and Ireland, with fmns leading ESPRIT, 
BRITE, ECLAIR, Raw Materials, and RACE projects. While the sample cannot be said 
to representative, the interviews provided in-depth insights to the impact of the Frame-
work Programme on the technology strategies of firms and to the factors that affect their 
willingness and ability to exploit the results of EC R&D projects. 
3. The Framework Programme and European Industry 
A look at the literature on EC sponsored R&D reveals the multiplicity of factors that 
encourage firms to participate in EC R&D activities. This indicates the importance of 
v firms' technology strategies, as it shows that different firms participate for different 
reasons and with different objectives, anticipating different benefits. 
Technology  strategy  involves business strategy and technology acquisition. According 
to the role of technology in business strtategy, three types of finn were distinguished: 
networks (business based on all possible ways of technology exploitation), machines 
(business based on production; technology acquisition serves existing production lines), 
and portfolios (business is based on  a coupling of  technology acquisition activities within 
the R&D department, with technology exploitation activities at the level of individual 
business units). 
The Framework Programme had a lot of response from network finns. For them it 
provides a good business environment that orientates their technology strategies, and 
provides them with a facility to make the contacts necessary for their business. EC 
programmes have often  provided the stimulus for  such  finns to engage in R&D activities. 
Such fll'IllS commercialize technologies at a very fast pace; they enhance the availa-
bility of  technologies in  the market and thus  enhance the innovative potential of  European 
industry as a whole. 
The fast pace of innovation by these finns creates problems for technology users, 
especially those with machine type technology management, who often do not have the 
capability to follow the pace and make the most beneficial technological choices. The 
standardization aspects of the EC ·programmes ~  very important in that respect. 
Although the Framework Programme provides firms with machine type technology 
management with the stimulus and the means to develop technological capabilities and 
strategies, their participation in its activities is limited. 
Large "portfolio" corporations broaden the scope of their R&D portfolios in view of 
the Framework  Programme. In  practice it provides their corporate R&D laboratories with 
more room to manoeuvre in  terms of both developing certain technologies and personnel 
management 
4. The exploitability of results of Framework Programme projects 
In only a few cases, projects aimed solely at process technologies. In  these cases the 
participating organizations aimed at using the results themselves. These projects were 
technically successful, although their results were not always exploited. In  one such case 
the results were commercialized because of a radical change in corporate strategy, due 
to a take-over. In another the results were kept "on the shelf" in case the organization 
needed them in the future. The difference in technology management played an obvious 
role. The first was a network firm while the second had "portfolio" type technology 
management 
In most cases, the projects had both product and process goals. According to the 
VI importance of collaboration for the product goals of the project leader, projects were 
distinguished between the categories collaboration-sensitive and collaboration-insensi-
tive.  In collaboration-sensitive projects, the project leader aimed at the development of 
a system incorporating the work-packages performed by the partners. In collalx>ration 
insensitive projects the work-packages of the other partners were not an essential part of 
the leader's goals, regarding the outcome of the projects. Consideting the goals of users 
participating in consortia, it becomes evident that for users projects are collalx>ration-
sensitive. 
In the choice of partners, the extent to which partnership was necessary for project 
implementation was a major factor. Accordingly the "collaboration-sensitivity" of pro-
jects was defined in  relation to  the goals of  the project-initiating actors. The more sensitive 
the project the more the technical  ability of the partners was important. The more 
insensitive the project the greater the importance attached,to the origin of  ~e  partners, 
which was seen as a political factor increasing or decreasing the possibilities to get EC 
funding. The quality of the communications infrastructure in less favoured regions of  the 
Community, as well as the financial viability of their industries, emerged as important 
factors influencing decisions to collaborate with fums from these regions. 
The design of the project had to strike a balance that would satisfy the goals of the 
Programme,  the goals  of the initiator and the goals of the partners.  Increasing the 
dependence of the goals of the partners on the goals of the initiator provided the means 
for controlling the direction of the overall project as well as potential competition. Limits 
to this were posed by the size of  the initiating finn and the extent of work it  could  perform. 
Academic partners were often chosen to perform important parts of the projects in view 
of their low potential for competition after the project. 
Detailed consortium agreements were signed to guarantee the coincidence of goals 
between the partners and the initiator and to limit potential competition. Patents previous 
to the projects provided effective means to that end. 
It appeared that all the organizations acknowledged that project goals shift in  time as 
a result of the partners' changing strategies or of new data arising from project implemen-
tation. A number of projects collapsed under these changes. To keep the right balance 
between the goals of the actors involved under changing conditions was the role of  project 
management. 
Three ways of dealing effectively with changes in a project's direction were found. 
The first, emphasizes coordination effort to guarantee a consensus between consortium 
members on all decisions related to project implementation. The second is to start the 
project with a consortium agreement for joint exploitation of its systemic goals, which 
emphasizes the community of interests between the partners in the exploitability of the 
results. The third, refers to the internal project management structures of firms, and in 
particular in the existence of a deparbnent and/or a project interfacing between their 
technology strategy and their EC R&D project. 
VII Technology flows within consortia did not seem to be more than what was required 
for project implementation.  Only one case was found involving an inter-organizational 
research team which worked together in all partners locations at the various stages of the 
project, and this case was governed by a consortium agreement for joint exploitation of 
the results. 
Technology flows within firms depended on their structures and on the interest of 
product developers and top managers in  particular projects. The smaller the fltDlS and the 
more informal their structures, the more results were communicated and screened and 
the more product developers and top managers were informed. Large business units 
located their R&D activities close to production and involved production personnel in 
them. Corporate R&D laboratories used fonnal reporting procedures to transfer teclmo-
logies to users, after their development had been completed. 
The product technologies developed in EC R&D projects in the sample were rarely 
commercialized. Consortium agreements for joint exploitation seemed to characterize 
these cases.  Such agreements were  an important mechanism  for compromizing the 
diverse goals of the partners regarding the projects and directing them towards conuner-
cialization or not of the outcomes. 
Even in successful projects the level of development reached was rarely adequate for 
commercialization, in accordance with the principle of pre-competitiveness. The extent 
to which further development effort was needed for commercialization varied, and was 
not directly related to  the willingness of firms to invest in it  This willingness was stronger 
in firms  following  a "hardening"  strategy  (of  moving  their business from  contract 
development to production of their own products). In all such cases, the hardening was 
based on the results of EC projects. 
In many cases firms pursue further development of their EC projects' results through 
subsequent EC  projects. Great value was attached by the finns to the results of EC 
projects, in tenns of process and training. One of the most important aspects of training 
is the accumulation of "international project management"  skills, which seem to be 
important for the ways business practices are developing in Europe. 
Some finns reported  that  they  learned  a lot about  managing  projects  from  the 
Commission's scientific officers. The staff of ESPRIT seems to worth special mention 
here as their conunitment to monitoring the projects and enforcing strict management 
rules was emphasized in many cases as one of the factors that helped project management 
a lot. 
5. Conclusions and lessons 
On the basis of the evidence and the analysis in the previous sections the following 
general conclusions may be drawn: 
VIII i) The technology strategies of actors that participate in consortia are a key factor in 
the exploitability of EC R&D results. The way firms perceive their EC R&D projects in 
relation to their business, determines the directions they will pursue in  project implemen-
tation and exploitation. Technology strategies also play a key role in project design and 
~anagement The dissemination of results also serves these strategies. Studies of the 
industrial impact of EC R&D programm~  have to take this into account. 
ii)  The extent to which the Framework Programme has affected the technology 
strategies of Euro~  firms varies according to their structures and their types of 
technology management It has contributed to the generation of a fierce competitive 
environment in the markets for technology as it  has been offering business opportunities 
to technology producers, promoting thus the innovativeness of an important part of 
Europe's technological potential. 
iii) The Framework Programme offers opportunities to technology users to develop 
technological capabilities and strategies. However, the host of technologies generated 
creates problems in the development of technology strategies by technology users, and 
even more problems to users without technology strategies, who operate in a rapidly 
changing environment In this respect, there may be a  role for the Community in 
intensifying its standardization efforts to reduce this type of problems. Complementary 
to this can be assistance to firms to develop technological capabilities and strategies and 
to understand the changes required by the competitive enviromnent of the 1990's. 
iv) The various dissemination fora do not effect technology transfer from firms that 
perform projects to their audience. Rather they provide marketing frameworks for ideas 
and results. Thus, commercial exploitation is the principle means for dissemination of 
EC R&D projects' results. In this sense there can be arguments either for stricter rules 
governing dissemination, or for R&D closer to the market In view of the existing 
pre-competitiveness principle that covers EC R&D projects, firms with network type 
technology management clearly play  an  important role in  the  economy  of  the Community. 
v) The importance of collaboration for project implementation and exploitation, can 
be seen as adding value, by increasing the productivity of  the R&D process. On the other 
hand, collaboration-sensitivity poses great problems in project management, especially 
when shifts in the goals of the project and/or the strategies of fums occur. To the extent 
that the Commission's programmes aim to increase the productivity of  the R&D process, 
collaboration-sensitivity can find a place in project selection criteria. However, further 
research is required to determine the ways collaboration-sensitivity appears in various 
collaborative structures, and accordingly its desired levels. 
IX vi) As EC R&D projects are different from companies' wholly self  -financed projects, 
effective exploitation of their results requires somewhat different management patterns; 
firms which realized it have been very effective in achieving their goals. The ability of 
firms to realize such differences and respond by establishing appropriate R&D manage-
ment processes, depends very much on company size, structure, management style and 
culture. However, such changes are very important as in an evolving world change is 
often synonymous to survival. 
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57 1. Introduction 
This document reports the fmdings of a study concerned with the interface between 
the EC Framework  Programme and the  technology strategy of  European finns in  general, 
and in particular with the management of  EC sponsored R&D projects by finns, and the 
exploitation of their results. The study was carried out by the Programme on Policy 
Research in Engineering Science and Technology (PREST), University of Manchester, 
in collaboration with the Fraunhofer Institut fuer Systemtechnik und lnnovationsfor-
schung (lSI) in Karlsruhe, Germany, and Centre de Sociologie de 1' Innovation (  CSI), 
Ecole des Mines, in Paris, France. 
The background to the study lies in the prevalent thesis that the competitiveness of 
European firms is very much related to their effectiveness in exploiting the results of 
R&D. 1\vo issues are put  forward under this thesis. The fll'St relates to the relative nature 
of  effectiveness in a competitive world, and  thus concerns the R&D management patterns 
prevailing in  Europe, as opposed to  those in  other parts of  the world. The  second  concerns 
the impact of the EC Framework Programme on the ability of  firms to exploit results of 
EC Framework Programme projects. The two issues are linked. At one level there is an 
obvious relationship between ways of managing the R&D process and the ability to 
exploit its results. At a more basic level there is a relationship between the fundamental 
mission of EC R&D to promote Europe's industrial competitiveness, and the creativity 
and innovativeness of European firms. 
These relationships define the object  of  this study, which  focused on  the ways in  which 
firms manage the R&D process and the exploitation of its results, as much through their 
own initiatives as through EC sponsored projects. At the first level the issue is one of 
firms' internal technology transfer structures and processes from R&D to production 
(See: Reger and Schroll1993, appendix 2). However, EC sponsored R&D projects are 
different from normal company projects in  a number of  ways, and it is in  these  differences 
that their impact on European industry can be looked for.  These differences bring about 
the object of the study at the second level. At  this level, the study focused on the interface 
between the Framework Programme and the technology strategy of European firms. 
The structure of the report is as follows: 
Section 2 presents the methodology followed, focusing on an interview programme 
carried out with 41 firms in Germany, the UK, France, the Netherlands, Italy, Belgium, 
Denmark,  Greece and  Ireland,  covering projects  frOQ1  ESPRIT,  BRITFJEURAM, 
ECLAIR, Raw Materials and RACE projects. 
Section 3 provides a background to the impact of the Framework Programme on 
European industry based on past studies. This demonstrates the importance of the way 
EC R&D programmes and projects interact with the technology strategies of firms, for 
the exploitability of their results. Further, it introduces the concept of  technology strategy and analyses the factors that shape it. It distinguishes between broad technology man-
agement patterns and relates them to the participation of  firms in Framework Programme 
activities.  A description of the finns covered by the interview programme and their 
technology management types is included in appendix 1. 
Section 4 analyses in depth the management of EC R&D projects and the factors that 
affect the exploitability of their results. It looks at project initiation, choice of partners, 
project design, patterns of project management within the project and within the firm, 
technology flows related to these patterns, and prevailing patterns of exploitation of the 
results. The analysis is illustrated by examples drawn from the cases examined, (which 
often include detailed case desCriptions). 
Section 5 presents the findings of the analysis, and draws conclusions on the key 
factors that affect the impact of the Framework Programme on European Industry in 
general, and project success and failure and the exploitation of the results in particular. 
Appendix 1 includes a description of the firms covered by the interview programme 
and their technology management types. 
Finally, appendix 2 includes the report of Guido Reger and Makrus Schroll on the 
German part of this study. 
2 2. Methodology: the interview programme 
Work proceeded in the form of semi-structured interviews with executives of com-
panies leading R&D consortia engaged in EC projects. The choice to interview only the 
leading partner reflected the assumption that leading partners are strategically poised 
towards exploitation of the results, as they have a large influence on the way the project 
is implemented. Indeed in most cases the coordinating organization was the organization 
which initiated the project. In a few instances this has not been the case, but still the 
coordinator was strategically poised to exJ>loit project results. Sometimes the project 
leader was the administrative rather than technical coordinator. These were cases when 
the initiator was an  academic and  the partners  preferred to  have a commercial organization 
dealing with the Commission. Again the coordinators were able to  provide a good picture 
of the project 
In all cases the people interviewed gave a  good picture of the way the projects 
developed and the results were exploited. The choice to attach emphasis to finished 
projects rather than on-going ones payed off in that respect.  The whole interview 
programme has been dominated by the need to collect in depth infonnation about the 
ways in which companies manage their projects in  general and EC projects in particular, 
as well as about the history of the projects under investigation, from their inception to 
their results and their exploitation. While the depth which the interviews managed to 
reach varied, especially in relation to company management structures and processes 
(companies often considered it confidential know-how), in all cases the interviews 
managed to throw light on the relations between the company's technology strategy and 
the way the project in question was perceived, managed and exploited. 
Initially it was anticipated that two people had to be interviewed in  each company: the 
project leader and an executive from one of the businesses who exploited the results. 
This methodological rule was bent in practice for a number of reasons. For example, 
typically through its history a project has more than one project leader. Often the initial 
project leader is impossible to locate, as he/she has changed business or even company. 
The degree of involvement of internal users to EC projects varies enonnously as a result 
of company sizes and management structures. In practice, the number of interviewees in 
each company varied between one and five. It must be noted that this does not reflect the 
quality of information obtained. This was detennined by  the seniority of  the interviewee, 
largely because of the broadness of perspective that high-standing executives have and 
their ability to interpret the companies' confidentiality rules. 
Interviews were carried out by lSI in Gennany, CSI in France, and PRFST in the rest 
of Europe. Project selection was random, nonetheless complying to a number of  criteria. 
Thus,  it concentrated on programmes with industrial participation.  The higher the 
industrial interest expressed in a programme, the higher the priority that was attached to 
it in our  sample. Effort was made to ensure that the number  of  cases  from each programme 
3 was not disproportionate to its overall weight within the Framework Programme. In 
practice RACE and DRIVE were excepted from  these criteria, due to their peculiar 
character, but most of all because of practical difficulties with arranging interviews with 
project leading companies. Effort was also made to encompass companies of all sizes 
and types in the sample. While geographical criteria were secondary, interviews took 
place in most Community countries. The following table gives the number of com-
panies/cases investigated, categorized by programme and by country. 
'Dlble 1: Interviews by country and programme: 
UK  F  NL  I  B  DK  GR  IRL  D  Total 
ESPRIT  2  2  4  I  3  I  1  9  23 
BRITFJ  1  2  I  1  5  10 
EURAM 
RAW 
2  I  3  Mat 
ECLAIR  1  1  1  3 
RACE  1  1  2 
TOTAL  5  4  4  4  4  2  2  1  15  41 
The interview guide consisted of  a checklist of  issues that had to be addressed, arranged 
in four sections, and concerning the company's businesses, its technology strategy and 
R&D management, the project, and the exploitation of its results in relation to the firm's 
technology strategy. 
4 3. The Framework Programme and European Industry 
While the first ESPRIT programme provided the developmental momentum that led 
to the establishment of the Framework Programme, the EC since its foundation has been 
sponsoring R&D  in a number of areas.  However, it was only in the mid 1980's that 
industrial R&D gained in importance, under the assumption that there is a relationship 
between the amount of R&D  performed by industry and  industrial competitiveness 
(  C.E.C. 1992-a) 
Programmes addressing industrial R&D, varied in their levels of industrial participa-
tion. ESPRIT, BRITE and RACE attracted significant industrial participation, while the 
Materials and Biotechnology programmes did so to a lesser extent (CREST 1992, Costa 
et al1988, Malmborg et a11990). Furthermore, the way the programmes function varies. 
Concentration on certain technologies was obvious in the early ESPRIT, RACE and 
BRITE. In time this situation changed. BRITE and ESPRIT broadened considerably their 
scope in both topics and range of participants, while RACE remained concentrated on 
the vision of  Integrated Broadband Communications. This has important implications for 
the ways these programmes impact on industry. RACE projects build on previous RACE 
projects, and while early projects concentrated on developing pre-standards, later projects 
started delivering commercializable results within the environment set by the pre-stand-
ards (RACE 1992)1. Very few BRITE projects build on previous BRITE projects. In 
ESPRIT the situation is mixed, with old projects providing the basis for new ones, but 
also including many new stand alone projects. 
Evaluations of programmes carried out by the Commission, mostly deal very briefly 
with the subject of their industrial  impact.  An  exception is  a recent  evaluation  of 
BRITFJEURAM finished projects (CEC 1992-b). This evaluation used quantified quali-
tative indicators, such as the exploitation potential offered by the project results and the 
capability and will of actors to exploit them.  The study found that the exploitation 
potential is 0 for 24% of the projects, less than ECU SM for 19% of the projects, between 
ECU SM and lOOM for 41% of the projects, and more than ECU lOOM for 16% of the 
projects. However, the willingness and capability to exploit these results was strong for 
only 37% of the  projects.  While the quantification is somewhat problematic, these 
findings are important in two respects. First, they indicate the subjectivity surrounding 
accounts of benefits deriving from EC R&D and second, they demonstrate the importance 
of firms' technology strategies, which incorporate the will and capability of firms to 
exploit EC R&D results. 
1  This derived also from the single RACE interview.  The interviewee however, had a long experieoce with 
RACE projects.  Only at the time of the interview be was overseeing four such projects. 
5 These ben,efits have been addressed in a study by Research Associates (1989) who 
asked a number of organizations industrial and non-industrial, from all over the Com-
munity, participating in a number of programmes, about the factors that encouraged their 
participation. The value of  their  findings is enhanced by  their  method. In  particular  instead 
of using a specified questionnaire that would elicit a range of specific possible answers, 
they preferred semi-structured interviews. The points drawn are presented in Table 2. 
Table 2: Factors that encourage participation in Framework Programme 
schemes 
Reasons  1imes indicated 
1. Funding for research,  59 
2. Increase in cooperation,  54 
3. Exchange of infonnation,  36 
4. Project progress*,  22 
5. Improvement of reputation,  8 
6. Outward orientation**,  5 
7. Better directions in product development,  4 
8. Provide for easier partnership fonnulation,  4 
9. Risk sharing in research,  3 
10. Access to equipment.  2 
Source: Research Associates (1989) Evaluation study on contribution to cohesion of 
EC Framework Programme. 
* EC programmes allow projects to progress more quickly or  further than they would 
with the existing state of an organization's capabilities 
**  Provides for enhancing the extent to which an organization takes into account 
development in its environment It includes such points as  "helps us to extend our 
markets", or "helps us act like a European company". 
6 From table 2 at first glance it seems that organizations perceive EC programmes as 
clearly additional to their own activities. EC provides R&D funding which they need but 
do not have, and through this incentive it provides for the establishment of collaborative 
relationships which would have not been established otherwise. It provides the means to 
organizations to monitor and position themselves in the European environment and to 
improve their reputation. However, considering that the survey included interviews with 
145 organizations the argument can also be reversed. If funding was significant for 59 
organizations only, then what was the major incentive for the remaining 86? If  collabor-
ation was significant for only 54 organizations, then what was the major incentive for the 
remaining 95? In short, what these results clearly indicate is that different organizations 
attach different value to different aspects of their participation in Framework Programme 
activities. 
Similarly, but through a questionnaire based on possible benefits for companies, 
Andersen Consulting (1989) attempted an analysis of the effects of EC R&D programmes 
on Dutch companies. Their fmdings are summarized in table 3. 
Thble 3. Effects of  EC R&D on Dutch companies 
Effect  Percentage of  companies 
indicating this effect 
1. More financial resources and 
manpower available for ·R&D  67 
2. A positive influence in the company  62 
3. Improvement of name and image  62 
4. A better competitive position  56 
5. A better technological position  49 
6. Activities in new markets  46 
7. Accelerated introduction of new 
products or processes  38 
8. Involvement in standardization  35 
9. Influence on R&D strategy  34 
10. A better preparation for 1992  33 
11. Commercial applications  28 
Source: Andersen Consulting (1989) Strategic Effects of  EC R&D Programmes in the 
Netherlands. 
7 Some of the effects indicated, such as "a positive influence in the company", and 
"influence on R&D strategy" are too vague, and it is not clear in what way they are 
beneficial. Furthermore, while additional R&D was performed in 67% of the companies 
surveyed, only in 28% it led to commercial applications.  This  again indicates the 
importance of the firms' technology strategies and the way EC sponsored R&D projects 
fit into it. This has been the focus of this study. 
3.1 The concept of  technology strategy: technology and business 
strategy 
Technology strategy incorporates the  ways in which  firms  plan and implement 
technology acquisition and the ways they appropriate their technologies. Ford (1988) 
sees technology strategy evolving around the "make or buy" choice, "make" referring to 
the launch of internal R&D projects, while buy referring to acquisition of technologies 
from external sources. He argues that technologies that are strategic to the company's 
competitive advantages should be developed intemally, while technologies which are not 
important for these advantages are better bought in the market. As Metcalfe and Boden 
(1990) argued, technology strategy develops within the framework of a strategic vision 
of  where technologies and markets are going, and of  relevant ways in which the firm can 
gain competitive advantages. Justification of internal investment in developing a tech-
nology, vis a vis the possibility for external acquisition, depends on the way competitive 
advantages accrue from the use of this technology in the firm's businesses. 
There is, however, an absolute minimum, a critical mass in R&D, without which the 
"make" option is not available. At first sight this seems to be related to the size of the 
finn, as it is  often assumed that  the larger a finn is the more R&D it will be able to perform. 
However, the association is not direct. There are very large fums which do not perform 
any R&D activities. Pavitt (1984) argued that for some sectors R&D is more important 
than in others. In sectors where technical change comes from suppliers of equipment, 
materials, human capital and ideas, firms can become very large without any internal 
R&D effort. It must be noted that even in such sectors ftrmS may find it advantageous to 
pedonn R&D, if only to enhance their ability to absorb technologies.  Nonetheless, the 
argument follows that in sectors where technological change comes from within there is 
an R&D threshold, that is a minimum amount of R&D that finns in the industry have to 
pedonn if they are to stay in business (See: Kamien and Schwartz 1982). A necessary 
condition for this is that the "buy'~ option is not available for finns in the sector. To the 
extent firms in the sector are willing to let their technologies diffuse, or cannot avoid 
imitation, the buy option is unavailable to first movers only.  This again indicates the 
importance of strategy rather than sector. If  the firm follows an offensive strategy, then 
it would have to pedorm internal R&D. Finns which are followers will pedorm less or 
not at all (Freeman 1982). 
8 The importance of sectoral factors for technology strategy stems from the fact that 
there are limits to the extent a finn can grow in a business without pursuing market 
leadership. These limits are set by the size of  the market and its pace of development. In 
the same way that cost advantages and economies of scale in production can erode the 
financial position of leaders, technological innovation can erode the market position of 
followers by making their products obsolete. Where the rate of change is very fast there 
might be no room for imitators. Where the leaders are large in relation to the size of the 
market they might pursue a rate of change that leaves no such room. 
All these elements affect the strategic visions of finns which shape the framework of 
their technology strategies. Sectoral perceptions answer questions such as: "what is our 
business?". Strategic visions relate to questions such as: "how does the firm sees itself in 
the business?", "how do other firms in the business behave?", and "what should it do to 
fulfil its vision for its position in the business?" These are the questions that concern 
business strategy. A number of aspects of business strategy relate to technology. The 
business may be defined in technological rather than market terms, e.g. lasers. Accord-
ingly the firm may perceive its position in the market in terms of its technologies, i.e. 
technological leader, follower etc., and relate its strategies to  teclmology acquisition. The 
way the aspects of a firm's businesses that relate to technology are decided upon and 
managed constitutes the technology strategy of  the firm. Firm structures and established 
decision-making processes play an important role here. 
In a seminal work, Burns and Stalker (1961) distinguished the structures of firms as 
organismic or  mechanistic. Their analysis focuses on  the  flexibility of  the structure which 
determines its adaptability to changing environments. Important characteristics are the 
degree of hierarchy (high in mechanistic low in organismic), the delegation of power to 
the divisions (high in organismic, low in mechanistic), and the flexibility of the com-
munication structures established for decision-making. The size of the firm plays an 
obviously important role in  these characteristics, as the larger the firm the more formal-
ization of structures and processes is required in order to achieve coordination between 
the various functions. However, size is not determinant. Very large companies can be 
organized in flexible "matrix structures", and very small companies can be characterized 
by rigid hierarchies. 
Burns and Stalker (1961) argued that mechanistic structures hinder innovation. The 
more innovative a firm is the greater the need for organismic structure. The more the 
business strategy of a firm is based on  exploitation of its technologies through continuous 
innovation the more organismic it needs to be. Thus, small firm-size facilitates the 
function of the self  -organizing  coordination processes that characterize organismic 
structures, and small firms· can  follow strategies of  continuous innovation and technology 
exploitation easier than large firms. The other side of the coin is that small innovative 
firms have to rely on external technology acquisition more than innovative large firms 
as the latter by definition have more resources to dedicate to R&D. 
9 Sector, size, structure and strategy are all factors that affect the way a firm sees 
innovation and the way it formulates its technology strategy. In analyzing the relations 
between business and technology strategies, Allouche and Pogorel (1990), distinguished 
between three types of  technology management: networks, portfolios and machines. The 
first corresponds to a strategy centring on technology and following all the possible 
exploitation lines. Technology dominates business strategy. The second corresponds to 
a coupling of  technologies to production into a portfolio, which results from case by  case 
negotiation on its contents. The third corresponds to a dominance of business strategy 
over technology. It is the portfolio of production activities that dominates technology 
management 
These three types of technology management are discussed in  detail in  the following 
section, which analyzes their implications for R&D organization. In doing so, data from 
this study will be used in order to understand the limitations of the categories but also to 
describe in a meaningful way the sample of the interviews carried out A presentation of 
our sample in these terms can be found in Appendix 1. 
3.2 Implications for R&D performance and organization: 
technology management in  the firms studied 
Firms with machine type management 
Finns with machine type technology management exploit technologies only to the 
extent they are applicable to their existing production lines. Thus, this type of manage-
mentis dominated by a perception of  competitive advantage in economies of  scale rather 
than scope. As efficiency in production is imperative, mechanistic structures prevail. 
However, competitive advantages offered by economies of scale depend on the sector of 
operation, and costs of  capital and labour  determine the  threshold of  fixed costs associated 
with production capabilities. Thus, in areas with similar labour and physical capital costs 
machine type strategies will be associated with large firms in sectors characterized by 
relatively low rates of technical change. For such firms, the scope Inherent in R&D is 
associated with inefficiency. Thus these finns perform no or very little and very spe-
cialized R&D close to their production activities. In the technology strategies of these 
firms the "buy", rather than "make", option dominates. Sectors where this type of fmn 
predominates, such as metallurgy, textiles, mining etc., are characterized by  the existence 
of sectoral R&D laboratories which provide technology to a  variety of firms, thus 
exploiting the scope associated with R&D activities. 
During the study, two textiles firms were looked at. Fmn A had some 5000 employees 
and finn B ·had some 100,000 employees. Firm A was following a clear "machine" 
strategy. It performed no internal R&D, and it was a member  of  a joint  research institution 
together with a  number of other European textile manufacturers. Firm B  had been 
10 following a "portfolio" strategy, incorporating the operation of a corporate R&D labora-
tory and diversification of businesses into chemicals and new materials (for textiles). The 
businesses of chemicals and new materials involved much more intensive technology 
exploitation than the textiles businesses. As a result the company was split into two, one 
focusing only in the textile sector and following a "machine type" strategy, while the rest 
of the businesses together with the corporate R&D laboratory were incorporated in the 
other company which follows a portfolio type strategy. 
Finns with portfolio type management 
Portfolio  type technology  management  can be found  in  finns  trying  to exploit 
economies of scale and scope. The portfolio itself can be seen as a means to manage the 
scope of technology generation by identifying synergies between R&D  projects and 
production activities. The existence of a portfolio of production activities indicates that 
these firms can be found in  any sector. To the extent that economies of scaJe are important 
in their sectoral production activities, these firms cannot be small. Mechanistic structures 
prevail to facilitate  economies of scale,  as  well  as  to ensure control in very large 
organizations.  The  wider their production  portfolios,  the  more  internal  R&D  they 
perform. Specialized R&D close to production supplements the activities of a corporate 
R&D laboratory. Indeed the existence of a corporate lab is typical of this technology 
management type, as this is where the scope in technology generation appears. The degree 
of influence of  the corporate R&D laboratory in  the shape of  the portfolio is an important 
factor in the  relationship  between business  and  technology strategy.  The more the 
influence of corporate R&D, the more technology strategy dominates business strategy. 
During the study a number of  firms' corporate R&D laboratories were looked at. These 
belonged to corporations with operations ranging from automobiles to electronics, and 
from textiles to steel. The interviews made it clear that during the 1980's there had been 
a shift towards greater influence of the businesses on the shape of the portfolios of these 
laboratories. The trend has been for the corporate R&D laboratory to develop into an 
internal 'contract' R&D organization, and to shift the decisions about which technologies 
are important for the enterprise from corporate R&D to the business divisions. Only in 
one case was  the  corporate  R&D  laboratory the technology strategy-maker of the 
enterprise. In this case the lab was performing R&D, monitoring suppliers, customers 
and competitors and deciding the technology strategy of  the whole corporation. This can 
be explained by the fact that the corporation in question was relatively small, with less 
than 5000 employees, and so corporate management was closely involved in all aspects 
of the business. Furthermore, the range of their businesses was relatively small Even in 
this case, however, there was a movement towards strengthening the technology strategies 
of the business divisions and weakening the strategy making capacity of corporate R&D. 
ll The rest of  the corporations with corporate R&D laboratories looked at had over 50000 
employees. In  these cases some 70% of the corporate R&D budget came from contracts 
with the product divisions. The rest 30% of the budget is typically financed by corporate 
management through "strategic funds" as well as from external sources. The freedom of 
the corporate laboratories to perform research for external customers varies significantly. 
In all cases there was a clear commitment to consider the product divisions first. What 
varied was the consideration of R&D projects for external customers, in particular to 
what extent the decision to undertake such projects related to strategic or to monetary 
gains. This, however, seems to be related to  the cash-flow situation in the enterprise rather 
than to sectoral differences. When asked about the general cross-sectoral uniformity of 
structures and processes related to R&D management in  very large corporations, an R&D 
manager of an electronics corporation commented on corporate cultures: 
"our managers must read the same  journals~ 
Finns with network type management 
Network type management indicates strategies for exploitation of all the scope offered 
by technology generation. They can be seen as strategies exploiting in  full core techno-
logical rather than production skills. The more generic the skills the more scope there is 
for such strategies. Finn structures with organismic characteristics prevail to facilitate 
exploitation of  the full scope of  the core technological skill; R&D is performed to enhance 
it. This type of strategy would be inefficient in sectors where economies of scale in 
production are important, to the extent the opportunity cost of investing in the core skill 
would be higher than that of investment in  extra production capacity. As a result this sort 
of strategy is likely be found in  sectors that produce "soft" products, where customization 
is an essential part of the business. As each customized development project enhances 
the core skill, the finn's projects have characteristics of R&D activities. R&D  is an 
integral part of production. 
During the study a number of software and engineering companies with network type 
technology management were looked at. Two software companies were large with more 
than 5000 employees and two were medium sized with approximately 500 employees. 
The rest of the firms were small with less than 100 employees. The characteristic of  these 
companies is that they had been carrying out little or no R&D with own funds, at least 
until the mid 1980's, mainly exploiting the skills of  highly qualified personnel rather than 
internal R&D findings. Close contacts with clients and suppliers (hardware vendors) are 
considered as the key to performance, as companies aiming at growing through a network 
strategy have to keep at the leading technological edge. 
However, as markets "harden", that is as dominant designs are being established, such 
companies face increasing pressures to tum into producers. The alternative strategy is to 
specialize in "advanced" niches, being amongst the first who will start developments 
12 around new hardware  or new applications,  and  attempt to  transfer these advanced 
technologies to traditional uses emphasizing the superiority of customized products over 
packages. One of the four larger software finns has already turned into a producer of 
software packages. Another two are still following a clear network strategy emphasizing 
the core technological skill which is related with successful applications in advanced 
niches. However, these two finns face increasing pressures to perform internal R&D. The 
fourth one, which was established in the mid 1980's, follows a strategy of commercia-
lizing advanced applications. This strategy has the company dedicating some 20% of its 
turnover to R&D, which takes place in two laboratories; one owned by the company and 
one being a joint venture with a public research organization. 
Other "transitional" ~es 
It must be noted that the distinction of  teclmology management practices in machines, 
portfolios, and networks is not at all clear-cut An example provides a bioteclmology 
company. The company was a new, largely research based SME (65 researchers out of 
100 employees), which had not any established line of businesses, as it was based on a 
technology for genetic alteration of agricultural products which for legal reasons could 
not be commercialized at the time of the interview. It was funded by shareholder's capital, 
"having enough money in the bank to sustain its operations for another eight years without 
any staff-cuts". The company was managed via a portfolio of technologies and potential 
markets, having established very strong mechanisms to monitor the moves of its potential 
competitors. However, the portfolio was used as part of a strategy for exploiting all lines 
of technological development pursued.  Thus it was  combined with  a network type 
technology management 
The categorization of technology management practices in machines, portfolios, and 
networks, by Allouche and Pogorel (1990), was based on a survey of large corporations. 
In these corporations management practices are well established and change is slow. It 
is more difficult to apply these categories in small firms where nonnally as part of 
strategies for business growth technology management practices change more quickly 
and  long  periods  are spent in transitional  stages.  Furthermore,  the  outcome  of the 
transitions is difficult to predict, and often does  not fit neatly into one of the three 
categories. As part of strategies for growth finns might follow a "hardening" strategy, 
which implies developing production portfolios, while still managing technologies which 
do not affect their competitive position in production through a network type; or they 
could follow a "softening" strategy which involves developing technologies relevant to 
their production activities but that can be appropriated outside these activities through 
"network" type management While both cases can be seen as transitions from network 
to machine management styles and vice versa, they do not fit to the portfolio management 
category, and often they are not seen as transitional. 
13 A number  of  finns in  our  study  were in  this state of  affairs, including engineering  finns 
who were trying to develop their own products, and manufacturing finns that were 
developing technological capabilities in order to diversify vertically and horizontally. 
The former transition was accompanied by a perceived need to move away from contract 
development and to develop internal R&D for support to production. The latter was 
accompanied by a perceived need to develop R&D in order to accumulate the techno-
logical skills needed. External funding was seen as very important in these cases. It is 
important to note that it appears that these states of affairs are the norm rather than the 
exception in  finns with a limited range of  business that perform R&D. It  is  also important 
that these inter-mediate types of technology management are nonnally seen not as 
transitional but as established business practices. For example in  one subsidiary of  a very 
large corporation, internal R&D was serving both, the production needs of the company 
(machine) and its customized micro-chip production business (network). 
3.3 Thchnology Strategies of  firms and participation in  the 
Framework Programme 
The categorization of technology management types followed, serves the purpose of 
categorizing ways in  which business strategies are linked to technology acquisition and 
exploitation. This is important in examining the interface of a firm's activities with EC 
R&D programmes. EC programmes link to the fum in three dimensions: it's R&D 
activities which they fmance; its technology strategy which relates to decisions about 
partnerships and type of projects to be financed-;· and its business strategy to the extent 
that this relates to technology strategy. From the previous sections it becomes evident 
that the organization of R&D activities within finns varies according to whether they 
have technology management of a portfolio, machine, or network type. Therefore the 
motives to participate in EC R&D activities, their importance for, and their impact on, 
firms will be different for each of these types. This section presents the points that stem 
from such considerations. 
Large corporations with portfollo type technology management 
All the large corporations interviewed which had portfolio type technology manage-
ment,  participate  in a  large number of EC R&D  projects.  Within corporate R&D 
laboratories, proposals for research projects, which do not attract the immediate attention 
of the business units but are judged as potentially useful, are packaged in a portfolio for 
external funding, sometimes even in a specific portfolio for EC funding. These portfolios 
then are put forward to specific departments which monitor the R&D funding mechan-
isms of governments and the Community. When relevant calls for proposals are publish-
ed, proposals are  submitted. These proposals have normally to be  approved by top 
14 management  This  has recently  become  mandatory by FSPRIT and possibly other 
Community programmes. In some firms an indication of interest by a product division 
is also required according to their own procedures. 
It is very difficult to judge to what extent these projects would have been carried out 
by the company irrespective of EC support. The extent to which they are strategic to the 
company and the way in which they are strategic,  varies  according to the way the 
company's environment develops.  In some cases portfolios for external funding are 
being set simply to justify the employment of researchers who are not engaged in other 
projects, because of  product divisions squeezing their R&D budgets because of  cash-flow 
problems. In other cases external funding can be a way to quickly launch a project that 
appears strategic because of radical changes in the environment which were not foreseen 
at the time of the establishment of the R&D portfolio. In still other cases collaboration 
with external expertise is crucial for the project Fmally, the product divisions sometimes 
fail to recognize the innovative potential of inventions, and top management's "strategic 
R&D funds" are not enough to cover the costs. 
Case 1: 
When it  looked as if the West was going to launch an embargo ofSouthMrican  exports, 
companies  dependant on South Mrican raw materials  started  looking for  ways  of 
exploiting marginal sources. For one finn looked at during this study, EC funds provided 
the means to launch a project quickly and to develop the mechanisms to deal with such 
a crisis. Collaboration with sources of raw materials were crucial for such a project and 
the EC framework seemed very appropriate for it. However, political developments in 
South Africa led to the abandonment of the embargo and the results of the project were 
never used. Furthermore, if  the embargo had been enforced the company would have 
been forced to launched such a project. 
15 Case 2: 
When a technological breakthrough was achieved in the corporate laboratory of a 
major electronics company, funds were difficult to get from the product divisions as 
marketable applications seemed far ahead The company then decided to move ahead in 
collaboration with another electronics company, which had managed a similar break-
through, through ESPRIT. It is difficult to tell whether the company would have known 
about the similar breakthrough in the other company if they had not been together 
previously in ESPRIT projects.  Furthermore,  it is difficult to tell whether the two 
companies would have moved forward at the rate they did without EC funding. The most 
probable outcome would have been  that it  would have taken them much longer to achieve 
the results they finally did. The outcomes of the project provided a major innovation for 
both companies. 
In  both cases 1 and 2, the advantages of  carrying out  the projects within the framework 
of EC were very clear. However, in both cases it would have been difficult to argue that 
the companies would not have moved in the direction they did without EC support. 
Furthermore, these circumstances do  not apply to all EC projects. In  one case the manager 
of  the project clearly stated that  the project was so  important  for  his company  that it  would 
have been carried out irrespective EC funding. In  another case the manager made it clear 
that the results were there before the application for EC funds. What these stories tell is 
that the corporate R&D laboratories of very large corporations have enonnous R&D 
budgets, and established formal ways to manage their projects. While participation in EC 
programmes has had some influence on the way of operation of their technology 
management, this influence is little more than adaptation to the requirements of yet 
another source of funds. It affects little if at all the orientation and operation of their 
technology business strategies. 
Firms with machine type technology management 
Firms with a machine type technology management approach EC R&D programmes 
as users who can benefit from using technologies developed within projects. During this 
study only two firms that clearly belonged to this type were looked at. The reason was 
that this study was looking at project leaders, and these are usually organizations with 
experience in developing the technology in question. While this type of firm can provide 
a good test-bed for the results of  projects, internal development of technologies normally 
lies outside its activities. It is important to note that one of the two firms looked at was 
not a project leader, but as the leader was a research organization, the study looked at the 
firm as the user of the project results. 
16 Despite the above restriction, information about users with machine type technology 
management was gathered on a non-systematic basis as part of the general discussions 
concerning partnerships and the appropriation of the results. For this type of tum EC 
projects represent an alternative to buying-in technologies. In all cases they were not 
satisfied with the technologies available in the market and decided to get into a joint 
project in order to acquire more advanced technologies. In this sense EC programmes 
had an impact on the orientation of  their technology strategies. Considering that some of 
these companies did not perform any R&D outside their EC sponsored activities, EC 
programmes were also a stimulus for these companies to become involved in R&D 
activities. 
For companies that were already developing internal R&D as a means for diversifi-
cation and vertical integration, participation in EC programmes provided a valuable 
source of funds, as well as a way of learning quickly what sort of expertise was available 
and where to look for it. Furthermore, participation allowed them to gain valuable skills 
in  R&D and collaboration management. In  this sense EC programmes provided a means 
for these companies to develop technology strategies and to move into a "transitional" 
technology management type. Considering that this type of firm has limited resources 
for R&D, in both monetary and personnel tenns, EC projects were very important In 
both the cases looked at, EC funds. provided for carrying out projects that were attempted 
previously in collaboration with other organizations but had failed because of lack of 
funds. 
Firms with network type technology management 
In firms  with  network  type  technology  management,  technology  and  business 
strategies are virtually indistinguishable. These firms approach EC R&D programmes as 
business environments. Not swprisingly, it is on this type of ftm1 that EC programmes 
have the most prominent impact. They provide indications about the directions in which 
businesses develop, valuable funds for R&D, and contacts with potential users of their 
technologies. Depending on how they are approached, they provide opportunities for a 
"hardening" of business strategies or  for further continuation of "soft" business strategies. 
Finally, as it was pointed out by Laredo and Calion (1990)  EC programmes act as a 
powerful mechanism for the generation of "soft" firms. 
It would not be an exaggeration to argue that EC programmes have altered the nature 
of the engineering and Consultancy business in Europe. By acting as a stimulus for the 
generation of firms, they resulted in fierce competitive environments which forced finns 
to engage in more R&D in order to sustain their competitive edge. The two large software 
companies  looked  at  had  grown rapidly until  the beginning of the  1980's without 
performing any  internal R&D.  The launch of ESPRIT altered the perception of top 
management about the need to perform R&D, both because of the dominant rhetoric and 
17 because of the realization that competition was growing fiercer. 
While some of the companies in our sample admitted to having been EC R&D 
generated "soft" firms, they all argued that they are no longer based on EC funding, and 
that they have developed further clients. One EC generated soft finn which went bankrupt 
before it managed to do so was mentioned in an interview. In all such firms interviewed, 
EC funding is recognized as an important part of their income. As competition both at 
the level of EC funds and at the market is intensifying, some of these firms chose to 
harden their businesses and to involve in production. In this process, the contacts with 
other producers and users acquired through collaborations within EC programmes are of 
great value. Others chose to remain in the soft market, either feeling quite confident that 
they could be amongst the winners in competition within the "engineering" and consult-
ancy  markets,  or being unable  to develop  production capabilities.  There again EC 
programmes are invaluable. 
Finally, another impact worth mentioning here is that of EC project management 
procedures on some engineering firms. As many of the new "soft" companies have been 
of academic origins, their project management procedures are informal and sometimes 
they are considered as inefficient and as creating barriers to growth. A number of firms 
mentioned that they benefitted from the work of the EC official responsible for their 
projects, and that they have adopted the progress monitoring and reporting procedures 
enforced by the Commission in their other projects.  One UK engineering company, 
which, it must be noted, was not of academic origin, was particularly impressed by these 
procedures.  Formalization  of their  project  management procedures  along  the lines 
imposed by the Commission was seen as a means to increase productivity and to prepare 
the company for further growth. This was very important for them in view of the fierce 
competition characterizing the UK economy within the current recession. In  other similar 
cases firms indicated their initial frustration with the amounts of paperwork involved in 
the Commission's monitoring procedures, nevertheless mentioning that their experience 
indicated that benefits outweigh costs. 
Networks versus Machines: innovativeness and standardization 
As it was argued earlier, network type technology management is compatible with 
"soft" strategies of commercializing technologies rather than products. Soft firms are 
developers, not producers. Their increasing presence in the European scene, assisted by 
the existence of the Framework Programme, leads to an increasing presence of techno-
logies in market. As the competitive strength of such firms lies in their ability to innovate 
at a very fast pace and to differentiate their technologies from the ones of rival firms, 
these technologies are characterized by a large degree of differentiation. 
18 On the other hand, finns with machine type technology management are exploiting 
technologies compatible with their existing production lines. They are not developers of 
technologies. Rather they are users. In order to gain competitive advantages they largely 
buy in the technologies that offer them the best performance. In short they are the best 
customers of soft finns' developments. 
However,  this  is  also  a  source of problems,  as the differentiation  between the 
technologies offered by soft ftrmS, leads to ''lock-in" situations, in which machine type 
finns find it difficult to shift from one supplier of technologies to another, in order to 
maximize the benefit from the fast rate of development of the technologies they use. In 
short, the increasing presence of  soft firms in  the European scene through the Framework 
Programme entails standardization problems that work against the ability of part of 
European industry to benefit from the fast rates of innovation. 
While the participation of  machine type of  firms in the Framework Programme assists 
them in developing internal technological capabilities which can be of great help in 
surviving in this environment, not many such firms participate. Furthermore, stand-
ardization issues are dealt with by individual programmes to a vacying extent. RACE, 
dominated by the presence of large users, the European Telecom Companies follows an 
approach which puts standardization first. The standardization activities in ESPRIT and 
BRITE, however, are dominated by large suppliers and users whose approaches are very 
much based on their own technologies. In the light of the presence of a host of smaller 
technology producers in  ESPRIT and BRITE, it seems that standardization is an increas-
ingly important issue to be tackled by these programmes. 
19 4. The management of  EC R&D projects 
This section focuses on EC R&D projects within the technology strategy of firms. It 
analyzes the management of  all of  their aspects by the project leaders, from their initiation 
to the exploitation of their results.  The distinction between systemic,  modular and 
potential exploitation of  the project results, is introduced as a useful tool for this analysis. 
The  first two  types refer to  commercialization of  a project's results. Systemic exploitation 
refers to commercialization of the product or process goals of the project as they are 
revealed in its demonstrator. Modular exploitation refers to commercialization of auton-
omous  parts of these technologies.  Potential exploitation refers  to non-commercial 
exploitation of results, such as process technologies developed within projects with 
product aims, and other tangible or intangible assets generated such as better under-
standing, levels of  skills etc. To the extent systemic or  modular results required significant 
development effort to be commercialized that was undertaken outside the project, they 
are treated as potential exploitation. 
The collaboration aspects of the projects play an important role in the analysis, for 
two reasons. The first lies in the important differences between collaborations, which are 
not depicted by  treating them as an intermediate option between the "make" and the "buy" 
choice which characterize technology strategies. In  some projects collaboration is  necess-
ary for their technical success. This is the case when the organizations involved have 
complementary expertise which is essential for the project. When complementary exper-
tise is accompanied by control over complementary assets, collaboration is essential for 
the commercial success of their results. Such projects are called collaboration-sensitive. 
This is to distinguish them from projects in which complementarities are not essential, 
which are called collaboration-insensitive.  Georghiou et al  (1992)  found significant 
collaboration-sensitivities between industrial partners for some 66 % of the cases they 
examined in the UK. 
The second reason is that EC projects are a special case of collaborative projects, 
because of the subsidy involved and because of the role of the Commission as a client. 
The former is important in businesses where competition focuses  on efficiency in 
development (e.g. software) or production (e.g. textiles). In  these businesses the subsidy 
creates a slack within organizations which can allow them to perform R&D and enhance 
their scope for innovating. It must be noted that a number of firms in these businesses 
were found either not to perform R&D without associated subsidies, or to have started 
performing R&D stimulated by the existence of subsidies. 
The Commission's role as a client is important in relation to the characteristics of the 
collaborations. First, it may induce some collaboration-sensitivities to be built in the 
design of projects, in order to demonstrate their value as such. It is important to note here, 
that systemic exploitation implies a collaboration-sensitive project, as this provides added 
value in performing one project rather than a number of different ones. Second, some-
21 times the Commission imposes the addition of partners in consortia by linking it to the 
subsidy.  Third,  via the various  dissemination events it organizes,  the Commission 
provides fora for organizations to enhance and enrich their relations with other organiz-
ations and to create networks that are very important for their innovative activities 
(Lundva111988, Teubal et all991). 
The need to differentiate between modes of  exploitation of project results stems from 
the fact that collaboration-sensitivities and systemic exploitation are not always consist-
ent with the technology strategies of organizations as regards their EC R&D projects. In 
this study some of the projects looked at had to be collaborative. Others could have been 
performed by the individual finn and the added value from the collaboration was limited 
or  even negative as it imposed additional management costs. Thus, collaboration-sensiti-
vities relate to the exploitation strategies associated with the projects, which in tum 
determine how they are designed and managed and how their results are exploited. 
Taking all this into account, this section presents and analyzes in detail the way the 
projects examined were initiated, the factors that affected the choice of partners, the 
design of  the projects and  the management of  the collaboration. Then it  goes on  to  discuss 
technology transfer within consortia, as well as within individual firms from R&D to 
production. F'mally, the  factors that  affect the exploitability of  project  results are  presented 
together with cases of exploitation in the modes presented above. 
4.1. Initiation ofEC R&D projects 
In the majority of the cases examined the initial idea came from within the firm that 
later became  the project-leader. This was the case in all large finns that were interviewed. 
Furthermore, in all but two cases of large finns the idea came from within the organiza-
tional unit that initiated and coordinated the project. These two cases which are in many 
ways interesting follow: 
Case 3: 
In this large corporation the origin of the idea had significant network dimensions. 
The idea was generated as a result of  a discussion between a top-manager of  the company 
with a top-manager in another organization. This manager promoted the project within 
the corporate R&D laboratory. As they needed partners, they decided to apply for EC 
funding. The "other organization" did not participate in the project as it was located in 
the same country as the laboratory. 
22 Case4: 
In this large corporation the idea came from the top-management who seemed to be 
trapped in the discourse of contemporary international rhetoric. In particular it decided 
to use EC  funding to  engage in  a project similar  to ones initiated by  very large corporations 
in USA and Japan, which had national support. The project failed as did the equivalent 
American and  Japanese projects. The interviewee argued that the rhetoric prevented them 
from thinking out important aspects of  the project, and realizing earlier that it could have 
not succeeded given the state of the art in the relevant technologies and the functional 
requirements of the system. 
The general argument in all large corporations interviewed is that top management 
should prescribe general directions for technology strategy but should not decide on the 
sponsorship of specific projects. This is seen as the remit of R&D managers who liaise 
between R&D,  top-management,  and business units.  These business units of large 
corporations were a significant case here, as they had specialized innovation departments 
which were acting as R&D managers and technology strategists. Another significant case 
was that of large firms with offices in Brussels which sometimes provided ideas about 
specific projects that the flCIIl could initiate within the EC context, and played thus a role 
in the shape of their "EC R&D portfolios". 
In SMEs the situation was quite different In most cases the idea came from outside 
the company, or when it came from within it had significant network dimensions. Only 
two cases were found where the idea came from within the company and the decision to 
launch the project was taken without ex ante discussions with suppliers and customers 
about the merit of the idea. In  both cases, the project was aiming at developing around a 
patent held by the initiating finn. Another case which is worth mentioning involved two 
small firms who saw it as their business to develop ideas for EC R&D projects. One was 
a joint venture between two large European corporations, and was designed explicitly to 
do so. The other was a British firm which was looking towards EC funding as a way to 
overcome the cash-flow problems it was facing within the recession in the UK economy. 
Finally, it must be noted that in three of the cases investigated the coordinator was a 
"collective agency", that is an R&D organization funded by firms within an industrial 
sector. In one of these cases the idea came from a client organization, while in  the other 
two the idea came from organizations that supply external expertise to the agency when 
it is needed. In all three cases the project was in the main direction of the agency's 
technological interests. 
23 4.2. The choice of  partners 
While in most cases there were previous contacts between some of the partners, it was 
hardly ever the case that exactly the same consortium had worked on another project. In 
the cases where the idea came from outside the project-leader, or  where there were strong 
network dimensions in the initiation, the network formed the heart of the partnership, as 
collaboration within the network allowed for a constant re-evaluation of the merit of the 
idea.  However, often such networks were national, or needed external expertise to 
perform the project and thus more partners were looked for. 
Partners were looked for in the light of their reputation for technical competence and 
trustworthiness. The CommiSsion's programmes and data-bases were often used to find 
partners. In a number of cases a partner was found as s/he was "very active within the 
Community fora". Primarily two aspects of the project as it was seen by the initiator 
determined the criteria for the choice of partners. As it is explained further on in this 
section, these are the collaboration-sensitivity of  the initiator's goals and the potential for 
competition between the partners. These aspects were very important for the extent to 
which the national and institutional origins of partners played a role. National origins 
were also seen as politically important especially in the light of the commitment of EC 
R&D policies to promote "cohesion" in the Community. 
Collaboration-sensitivities and the technical ability of  the partners 
Collaboration-sensitivities stem from lack of expertise and resources needed to carry 
out aspects of the project as well as lack of resources necessary to exploit the results of 
the project in the envisaged way. Thus, the degree to which a project is collaboration-
sensitive varies between partners. To the extent a project was collaboration-sensitive for 
the initiator, the reputation of the partners in terms of their technical ability played the 
major role. 
The most collaboration-sensitive cases where those of initiators who would have been 
the users of the results but could not produce them without external expertise. All these 
cases led to projects for which collaboration was important, as there was a large degree 
of  interdependence between the roles of  the partners, at  least as far as success of  the  targets 
of the initiator were concerned. 
However, in a number of cases collaboration was not as important. This meant that at 
least the project-leader aimed at appropriating the results of the work-package s/he 
performs in the project, and there is limited interdependence amongst work-packages. 
This in turn implied that each finn had the expertise to perform a project to which it 
attached value. A number of such projects were packaged into one EC funded project and 
24 the participants took advantage from any synergies as well as from EC funding. However, 
these synergies were limited. 
A type of collaboration-insensitive project is what Georghiou et al (1990) define as 
risk-sharing  collaboration,  which  investigates the  value  of competing  processes.  A 
number of companies investigate the process they are most likely to use and at the end 
they share results. Collaboration is used as an information exchange mechanism but is 
not essential for the project to the extent this information exchange is not its primary goal. 
Standardization projects can be seen as a variant of this type. 
To the extent projects are collaboration-sensitive, there are "first mover advantages" 
in participation in EC R&D projects, in the sense that once an organization has created 
a reputation of being a good and competent partner, it is asked to participate in other of 
projects.  However,  as collaboration-sensitivity decreases, the politics of the partners 
increase in importance. 
The importance of national origins 
The national spread of the partnership seemed to be considered by managers as an 
important factor in the choice of the Commission to fund specific projects. Thus, in  many 
cases the introduction of many partners with non-essential roles was seen as enhancing 
the chances to get funding. In particular there seemed to be a "Southern bias" in these 
choices, justified by the perceived preference of the Commission in funding projects 
involving partners from Less Favoured Regions. 
In this light, it would seem that organizations from Southern. Europe would be the 
favourite partners for collaboration-insensitive projects irrespective of their competence. 
To a certain extent this is the case. Competent Italian, Greek, Spanish and Portuguese 
organizations are highly valued as desired partners. However, this does not extend to 
organizations that  are  not  as  competent,  even  in  collaboration-insensitive  projects. 
Managers with bad experiences with partners from one country often stated that they 
would avoid collaborating with others of that nationality in the future, because of the 
management problems this entails. 
Two more factors counteract the desirability of even competent organizations from 
Less Favoured Regions as partners. First, the quality of  the communications infrastructure 
in these regions is considered as poor and this creates difficulties in project-management. 
Second, within the EC programmes, if a partner goes bankrupt during a project it has to 
be replaced by a partner in the same country. As in Southern European countries there 
are  few  organizations competent in  state-of  -art technologies,  this  rule  often creates 
problems. In particular, considering that not many industries of the South are charac-
terized by financial strength, this rule creates a major disincentive to cooperate with firms 
from the South. 
25 Collaboration-sensitivities and potential competition 
Collaboration-sensitivities in project implementation sometimes apply with respect to 
exploitation of results and sometimes do not. In both cases potential competition in 
exploitation of the results is an important factor in the choice of partners. Its possibility 
can be alleviated by choosing partners from universities or  non-profit research centres or 
even companies whose business strategies are of a different kind, e.g. a manufacturing 
firm can collaborate with an engineering finn as their exploitation strategies are different 
by nature. 
However, this can take place only in cases where collaboration-sensitivities do not 
extend to exploitation of the results. In the opposite case, collaboration between firms 
always entails the possibility for potential competition.  In such cases the business 
intentions  of the partners  were always screened,  and reference was  made in their 
reputation for being trustworthy. All firms indicated that they would never collaborate 
with direct competitors. However, collaboration with indirect competitors such as firms 
in the same business in different countries was a frequent case. 
The importance attached to potential competition was related to the importance of  the 
project for the business strategy of the project leader. However, in all cases the technical 
ability of the partners seemed to be more important than their business intentions. The 
potential for competition was usually dealt with at the project design stage. 
Collaboration-sensitive projects involving suppliers and users, were typically built 
around very complex consortium agreements to prevent potential competition. Even in 
collaboration-insensitive projects, cases of suppliers and customers working together in 
a project render potential competition a very sensitive area. This type of  project is usually 
launched on  the basis of  trust generated through years of  a supplier-customer relationship. 
In  the one such case encountered during this study, the interviewee said: 
"They are our customers not our competitors. If  they wanted to compete with us we 
would have been out of  business a long time ago. In terms of  competition they belong to 
a different league". 
However, after more discussion the same interviewee said that because of the kind of 
competitive pressures their customers were facing, it was very unlikely that they would 
compete with them, and in any case for their project the competence of  their partners was 
more important than their business intentions. 
26 4.3. Collaboration and project design 
In  the design of  a project, the  partners' work-packages and their relations are specified. 
It is at this stage that the way collaboration-sensitivities are built in a project is decided 
upon.  In most cases examined the initiator played a major role in designing the project, 
and kept for him/herself the coordinating role. This allowed a degree of control over the 
work of the consortium which was seen as necessary for the achievement of its initial 
goals. When there was a network dimension in the generation of the initial idea, the 
organizations involved formed the core of the consortium which designed the project. 
Collaboration-sensitivities were an important element of project design,  as they 
provided the means to the designers to: 
a) make sure that the objectives of the individual work-packages will not shift during 
its implementation towards directions  that would possibly emerge in the partner's 
technology strategies; and 
b) limit the possibilities for competition between the partners after the project. 
Collaboration-sensitivities between the partners and the initiator in implementation 
and exploitation were serving these two elements respectively. In the words of a project 
leader 
''some parts of  the project were too critical for the project and its exploitation to be 
left or even revealed to other partners". 
However, the extent to which such project design was possible varied according to 
the capability of the initiator to perform critical parts of  the project him/herself, that is to 
the extents/he was involved only in the use, or also in the production of the project's 
results. 
Collaboration-sensitivities and vertical relations 
A factor that greatly affects collaboration-sensitivities is the existence of vertical 
supplier-user relations within a project. Such relations in project implementation reflect 
the provision of  performance specifications by  the user to which the output of  the supplier 
must comply, and evaluation of  the results by the user. Collaboration-sensitivities in such 
projects depend on the extent the supplier-user relationship is considered important for 
the exploitation of the results. In the case of the user commercializing the results, the 
vertical relationship remains intact after the project, and the interests of the supplier 
coincide with those of the user. 
27 On the contrary, in the case in which the supplier will commercialize the results and 
the user will use them there is an obvious source of conflict. The competitive advantages 
stemming from the use of the results will be alleviated by their commercialization which 
will make them widely available. Furthermore, the risks incurred by a user in a project 
are larger than those incurred by a producer. In the case of failure to reach the project's 
objectives, the producer is closer to achieving them but the user has little to use. This 
explains the opinion expressed in a number of our cases, that the Commission's colla-
boration contract does not adequately protect the users in consortia. 
Furthermore, often the user cannot protect itself by designing collaboration-sensiti-
vities because of  lack of expertise. In  these cases users protected themselves by becoming 
the project coordinators and by consortium agreements. The former can guarantee that 
the project directions will follow the user's criteria of success, but it cannot guarantee the 
way the results will be exploited. Thus, users experienced in collaborative R&D put a lot 
of effort into drafting detailed consortium agreements. While it has become conventional 
wisdom that the size of the firm is equivalent to the time spent in drafting consortium 
agreements, the character of participation in a project seems to throw new light into this. 
The importance of consortium agreements 
In our cases there was a tendency for firms participating as users in consortia to be 
larger then their producer-partners. A reason for this may be that producers would prefer 
a large finn as a client after the project is over, as user ftrmS would tend to place limits 
to the ability of producers to appropriate the results without them. This hypothesis applied 
to the majority of collaborations involving producers and user-firms. Large producer-
firms often involve government research institutions or "collective agencies" such as 
users' associations in their projects. Only two small user flllllS were found to be involved 
in EC R&D projects, and they participated together with such collective agencies. One 
of  them had a peripheral role, in the sense that they assisted in requirements specifications, 
but they did not perform the evaluation of the project results and in general they were not 
essential to the project. In the other case the user was where the idea originated and their 
role in the project was more substantial This case, which is presented as case 5, can be 
used as an example of what can happen to inexperienced user firms which do not prepare 
long and detailed consortium agreements. 
28 Case 5: 
The initiator of the idea was a leader in equipment manufacturing for the textiles 
industry. The finn had very automated design and production and their strategy was to 
achieve further integration between the two. It had an idea about how to do it and 
approached a  collective national  research  organization in mechanical  engineering. 
Together they decided that the idea was worthwhile pursuing and tried to get funding 
from national programmes. As this proved difficult, the research organization proposed 
EC programmes and the firm accepted. The research organization, which at this stage 
acquired the leading role in  the project, found another user-firm in another  country, played 
the main role in project design and proposed the project to the Commission with itself in 
the coordinating role. The Commission insisted that in order to support the project two 
large systems houses had to participate, one working mainly in customized and the other 
in packaged markets. This was accepted and a simple consortium agreement was signed, 
through which in case of project success the users would have had free maintenance by 
the systems houses for two years. 
The project was very successful. After its end the system was installed by the user 
with good results. The only problem was that it was a little slow. This did not prevent 
productivity gains anticipated from materializing, but it was annoying for the engineers 
who were using it The engineers of the user-firm knew what to do to make the system 
faster, but they could not do it because they had to alter software copy-written by one of 
the systems houses. While they were trying to find a solution to this problem, the systems 
house commercialized a similar system in which the slowness problems had been dealt 
with. So, the user firm had to buy this new system as otherwise productivity gains in  their 
competitors would have been larger than theirs. While they did not doubt the benefits 
from participating in the project in terms of better understanding of their operations and 
better understanding the issues involved in systems design, they were very frustrated by 
this development. 
The important elements of case 5 are the following: Ftrst, when the research organiz-
ation undertook the leadership of the project the initial idea changed in an essential way. 
From aiming to develop a system that would satisfy the specific needs of the user firm, 
it became to develop "such a system". However, the f11lll assumed that being the large 
user, and being situated close to the project leader, which in  tum  was a research institution 
with no specific interests in the shape of  the system, it  would be able to control the project 
specifications. This assumption seemed reasonable at the time. However, when the two 
large producers were placed into the project, the firm did not realise that its degree of 
control over the project specifications and the interests invested in them had radically 
shifted. And not being the project coordinator, it could not  control the subtle but important 
shift in the project's goals through the management of the project 
29 4.4. Management of  collaboration 
While project design has to strike a balance between the goals of the initiator, the 
partners and the Commission, the management of the project has to keep this balance 
throughout its implementation. This is not an easy task.  F'J.CSt,  the achievement of 
systemic goals often involves different technical choices from those that would allow for 
modular exploitation. Second, the initial goals of  the project often shift as a result failure 
of initial technical choices. 
One way of  dealing with such problems is to design collaboration-insensitive projects, 
in which these shifts do not affect much the exploitation plans of the partners. These 
projects are modularized in largely independent modules executable from start to finish 
by individual partners who come together at the end to build a demonstrator. Such were 
the 15 cases examined in Germany and none of them revealed plans for systemic 
exploitation. It seems that German finns, in view of the potential problems generated by 
collaboration-sensitivities,  identify strict modularization of tasks  with good project 
management. 
A different way of  dealing with this problem was revealed in  the cases of  Danish  fiCillS. 
From the cases investigated in Denmark, together with discussions in other countries 
about projects involving Danish firms, another cultural dimension in EC R&D project 
management seems to have emerged. Danish fums have a reputation, which is verified 
by  the findings of  this study, of  insisting in  project management processes involving very 
long consensus-generating discussions between the partners. Thus, when a decision is 
taken it is a consortium rather than an individual partner decision and serves the goals of 
the project rather than the exploitability requirements of a module. 
The extent of cultural uniformity revealed in the cases of Germany and Denmark was 
not found elsewhere. However, the technology management structures of flllllS emerged 
as another important factor in the way fmns manage collaboration-sensitive aspects of 
their projects. To the extent they are not dealt with at the project design level through 
strict modularization, such inter-dependencies often create discrepancies between project 
goals and technology strategy goals as both these shift in the course of the projects. In 
most cases this is approached as one of the expected problems with EC R&D projects. 
Their pre-competitive character which implies relatively low target specificity seems to 
be a contributing factor. However, the type of mechanisms that would deal with such 
discrepancies so that they would not affect the exploitability of the results, such as some 
type of strategic  monitoring of the  project  and  in particular the firms'  individual 
work  -packages by internal users, often do not exist. Only in two businesses units of large 
corporations were there specific mechanisms built into the fmns' structure to deal with 
these aspects.  These are presented as case 6. 
30 Case 6: 
In two finns R&D was perfonned under the supervision of an "innovation"  or 
"technology strategy" department and without the existence of a dedicated R&D depart-
ment. R&D was performed mainly by production personnel working part-time. In  these 
cases the R&D work followed the relevant appropriation strategy of the firm. The work 
was supervised,  monitored and directed by the innovation department,  which was 
responsible for the collaboration within the EC project. To the extent the EC project 
covered the appropriation requirements of  the finn, there was one project going on under 
two reporting procedures, one dealing with the needs of the EC project and one with the 
needs of the firm. To the extent the two sets of needs were different, project implemen-
tation was broadened to cover the interface between the firm's technology strategy and 
the project. However, the two reporting procedures helped the firm to differentiate in 
practice between the part of its effort that goes into the EC project and its own. This 
duality was stronger in one of the two projects examined as there was a risk of potential 
competition between some of the partners involved. 
The way of managing EC R&D projects presented_ in case 6 has advantages, as it 
allows for a clear demarcation of what the EC and the partners should learn, and what is 
found out by the organization. Thus, there is a great degree of control of ideas and 
technology transfer from the finn to the partners and the Commission.  And as the 
knowledge generated cannot be less than what is needed for the EC project, whenever 
there is a surplus it can be appropriated only by the performing finn and nobody else. 
4.5. Collaboration and technology transfer in consortia 
The more collaboration-sensitive a project is, the  more inter-organizational knowledge 
flows it results in. This is because of the cumulative character of knowledge acquisition 
at two levels. The first is the level of an organization. An organization learns by relating 
information to what already constitutes its knowledge base, thus altering this knowledge 
base (Weingart 1977). The second is the level of the R&D project. This progresses 
cumulatively as targets are set on the basis of what is known, and modules are built on 
the basis of the results of previous modules. The more interdependent the modules of an 
R&D project, the larger the amount of knowledge that has to be shared between their 
implementors. Thus, in general the minimum requirements in inter-organizational knowl-
edge flows are higher between partners in inter-dependent roles within R&D consortia. 
Furthermore, the more coordination is needed, the more often people meet, the more 
"informal know-how trading" takes place, and the more cooperation is described as 
"close". 
31 Here one should distinguish between the three aspects of technology, that is knowl-
edge, skills and artefacts (Metcalfe and Reeve 1990). It must be noted that these three 
aspects are not technologies on  their  own. Rather the  three together constitute  technology. 
Thus, while artefacts can be purchased they are useless without knowledge of what they 
can do and skills related to their use. Knowledge and skills related to how they are made 
can be invaluable when an artefact has to perform a function within a system. Small 
modifications often increase functionality rapidly. Artefacts can be seen as incorporating 
knowledge. Learning by doing and using are on the one hand an essential element of 
relevant skills, and on the other hand related to specific artefacts. Thus, collaborations 
that involved exchange of physical artifacts were described as "real collaborations". 
Knowledge is transferable through communication, and according to the findings of 
this study closeness of collaboration clearly depends on the frequency and content of 
communication between people from partner organizations. However, close collabora-
tions between different research teams rarely exceed the minimum requirements in 
knowledge flows. These can be identified by using Vmcenti  's (1990) distinction between 
procedural and descriptive knowledge. Collaborations between teams require flows in 
descriptive knowledge. 1\vo interdependent teams have to share knowledge of what the 
expected outcome of  the two modules is and how  the two modules combined will produce 
this output. However, procedural knowledge on how the modules were built is not often 
exchanged, at least within EC sponsored R&D projects. In one particular case, it was 
mentioned that procedural knowledge was deliberately kept secret to alleviate possi-
bilities of potential competition. 
Even in cases where the collaboration involved procedural result-sharing, that is in 
cases where two or more organizations were involved e.g. in evaluating the usefulness 
of competing techniques, transfer of procedural knowledge was limited. When intervie-
wees leading such projects  were asked if  they could after  the  project  implement  the results 
of their partners, their answers were something close to: 
"Well,  we have a good enough guide of  roughly what to do,  and what sort of  errors 
we can avoid.  Yes,.  I thin/c it will take less effort than starting from scratch. " 
In other words, reports of project results can transfer only the codifiable aspects of 
technology (Saviotti and Metcalfe 1986), and these aspects are of little use without the 
tacit knowledge that makes them directly implementable. 
32 Transfer of tacit knowledge takes place only when transfer of people is involved. In 
this sense, transfer of tacit knowledge between partners in consortia takes place only 
when the work packages of different partners are collocated, that is when the project or 
parts of it are performed by an inter-organizational research team. However, the benefits 
of these flows can be more easily realized when projects aim at systemic exploitation. In 
the single case in which the project was implemented through forming an inter-organiz-
ational project team and moving it between the sites of the partners, it is anticipated that 
the results will be commercially marketed by the consortium. Other studies have found 
that in cases of firms aiming at modular exploitation of results and collocating their 
activities, the joint knowledge base of the research team creates problems in the transfer 
of results to each individual firm (Georghiou et all990). However, this type of case was 
not found during this study. 
4.6. From R&D to exploitation: technology transfer within firms 
While the essence of  technology transfer within firms lies in  the frequency and content 
of communication between people in their various departments, it differs fundamentally 
from technology transfer in consortia, as cooperation between a fnm  's departments 
should be, by definition, closer than that between firms, and possibilities for potential 
competition should be,  by definition, zero.  Indeed, a finn can be seen as a-set of 
established cooperative structures. These structures display a certain degree of  formaliz-
ation and departmentalization, and incorporate aspects of a finn's life such as technol-
ogy-strategy-making and  innovation.  Thus, technology production,  monitoring, 
screening, transfer, and exploitation are reflected in a finn's structure. 
As far as technology transfer is concerned, the closeness of collaboration can be 
analyzed in a dimension starting with formal reporting procedures which transfer only 
codifiable knowledge, and ending at collocation of activities. Thus, location can be used 
as a first approximation of closeness of collaboration. In this sense one can distinguish 
between technology transfer channels that refer to projects performed at a corporate R&D 
laboratory, R&D department of a business unit and R&D located at the same site as 
production. This distinction also reflects the way R&D performance is accounted for, as 
well as the way this performance is monitored and strategic decisions are taken at that 
level. 
33 Corporate R&D laboratories and formal technology transfer channels 
As it was argued earlier, there is a strong uniformity in the ways corporate R&D 
laboratories are integrated within the structures of firms. 1YPically, they follow their 
projects through to development, irrespective of whether these projects are requested and 
paid for by a business unit or not The monitoring procedures differ for different projects 
according to the interest the business units take in it. However, most of the strategic 
monitoring takes place within the corporate laboratory. By and large, it is the laboratory 
that decides what the useful products and by-products of R&D are and in what directions 
they could be appropriated. Thus, corporate R&D laboratories can be seen as having a 
business strategy of their own. One such laboratory was found to have established its 
own business in producing customized products based on its expertise. 
The communication structures surrounding the corporate R&D laboratories consist of 
committees which bring together managers of similar levels from the corporate laboratory 
and the business units. The work of these committees extends from defming the corpor-
ation's technology strategy to defining the items of the R&D budget However, the extent 
to which these committees deal with monitoring the projects of the corporate laboratory 
rarely extends further than the progress towards the specified goals, and the extent to 
which this happens depends obviously on the investment the project represents for a 
business unit. Thus, even this type of monitoring was very weak in most cases examined 
during this study. 
Once the results that have been achieved by the corporate laboratory are judged to be 
exploitable, then technology transfer takes place through formal channels. Reports are 
circulated, sometimes demonstrations take place within the corporation, and blueprints 
are given to product development or even to production departments. The corporate 
laboratory undertakes the training of "production people when necessary". Thus, tech-
nology transfer from  corporate R&D  laboratories to business units has many of the 
characteristics of technology transfer between two different organizations. A large degree 
of organizational autonomy in monitoring and strategic screening of a project, monitoring 
of progress rather than content by the client organization, and formal technology transfer 
channels. When business units wish to be more actively involved in a project, then they 
participate as partners. Thus, corporate R&D laboratories can be seen as very similar in 
function to sectoral R&D organizations. 
34 Collocation of  R&D and production 
At the other end of the spectrum, in  firms where R&D takes place as part of production, 
technology transfer cannot be separated from technology generation. The cases of this 
study revealed two types of such collocation of activities. In the first type the project 
takes place at the same site as production but uses different people than production. Thus, 
production people can see how the project develops, and both, R&D and production 
people can benefit from the tacit knowledge of their colleagues. In the second type, the 
project is performed by production people working on it on a part-time basis.  In such 
cases there is literally no need for technology transfer. While, there were projects of both 
categories examined, typically the later stages of the former type involved production 
people and belonged, thus, to the latter type. Such project organization was found mainly 
in mature industries, where production people were used to working with very different 
technologies to the ones developed by the project, while there were R&D people within 
the firm familiar with them. 
Collocation and strategic monitoring 
While collocation was being used in firms of sizes ranging from 6 to 5000 employees 
as a means of quick and effective technology transfer, the extent to which the projects 
were strategically monitored and screened varied according to the type of technology 
management. This type of monitoring is an essential element of  network type technology 
management.  Thus,  in firms  with  this  type of management  internal  seminars  and 
presentations are often held, in order to re-evaluate the exploitation possibilities offered 
by the progress of their projects. In finns with machine type technology management 
such monitoring was not part of the finns' practices.  Fmns following "transitional" types 
of technology management related to a softening of their business strategies, often had 
not adopted  such  monitoring  procedures.  In cases of "hardening"  strategies on the 
contrary such procedures were still considered as  an essential element of technology 
management. 
R&D departments of  firms 
In the cases where there was an R&D department within the firm, the extent to which 
strategic  monitoring  was  left  to  the  R&D  department depended  on the  degree  of 
organizational autonomy it enjoyed. However, it must be noted that this type of R&D 
organization is not clearly demarcated from the other two.  Such "R&D departments" 
examined in this study where either product development departments which had a central 
strategic role within the business but operated with production engineers, or information 
technology departments which were dealing with process and office automation,  or 
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case 6. In all these cases the job of these department was "to know what is going on and 
to  find ways of  improving it". Thus, they were surrounded by  informal structures through 
which their projects were monitored and their technologies transferred. Only the depart-
ments mentioned in case 6, were clearly demarcated, and liaised strategically between 
production and R&D. They had control over the internal technology transfer structures 
judging each time to what extent certain reporting procedures, formal training and 
collocation of activities are required. 
4.7. Technology strategy and the exploitability ofEC R&D results 
The difficulties of defining exploitability of R&D results in an objective manner is 
one of the basic assumptions behind this study. A number of  factors have been identified 
in the literature as affecting it. Schmoch et a1 (1991) argue about the utility of patents as 
an indicator. However, whether or not a firm would apply for a patent is a matter of 
strategy. The argument so far has been that the exploitability of results of EC R&D 
projects is related to the way the projects are being incorporated into the technology 
strategies of participating firms.  This argument is further supported by the findings 
presented in this section. 
Exploitabillty and dissemination 
Results of  EC R&D projects are exploitable only  for  the  organizations  that  have  carried 
them out. The results that are disseminated and come into the public domain concern 
broad descriptions of what and how was found, rather than detailed descriptions of data, 
method and results. In this sense conferences and other dissemination events are used as 
marketing fora, rather than as a means of  scientific communication governed by  the norm 
of total disclosure (Dasgupta 1987). As an executive put it: 
"I tell them this is what I found and that is why I think it is usefuL Now, if  they want 
to know my algorithms, they would have to look for them themselves". 
Thus, it is only the participating firms that have the detailed knowledge that can allow 
them to exploit the results, and it is their technology strategy that determines perceptions 
of what exploitation opportunities exist. 
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Patents and EC R&D projects 
In  general in the projects looked at during this study, patenting was not a major issue. 
While in some projects individual partners applied for patents, the systemic goals of the 
projects were nonnally too complicated to be patented. As expected, different organiza-
tions in different sectors had different attitudes towards patenting, and only two of the 
organizations looked at had a strong patent-oriented strategy.  One was a  "collective 
agency", a sectoral research organization in minerals. They indicated that the industries 
they work with are currently becoming increasingly scientific in their methods, and thus 
patents provided effective  means  to acquire  a good market position.  Also,  as this 
organization served more than 40 firms from a variety of countries it could easily detect 
infringement of its patents, while having no ambition to move into production, licences 
provided one  of  its main sources of  income. The other  was a biotechnology firm. Similarly 
to the minerals organization, they said that biotechnology is 
"a field where patents are very important and offer good protection,  while they are 
easily monitored as there are not many actors in the game". 
In both these cases patents were seen as means to grasp developing markets, as parts  ',, 
of a strategy for technological leadership. 
Larger firms in the electronics sector who mentioned patents, indicated that they use 
them as part of a "co-leadership" strategy. 
"Our target is not to grasp whole markets': a manager said.  "Rather we are looking 
for strong patents that we could trade with our competitors through cross-licences in 
order to continue to do our  job". 
In general patents acquired before the projects, on which the projects were based, 
seemed to be more important for the exploitability of project results than patents applied 
for because of the projects. This is because such patents allow for total control over 
potential competition in the exploitation of project results, while, as it will be shown 
further on, EC R&D projects are a wide spread way of developing results of previous EC 
R&D projects. 
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The R&D-production interlace is an integral element of a finn's technology strategy, 
as it determines what aspects of the scope for exploitation are taken into account and 
pursued. In  narrow terms of technology transfer, the pattern followed relates to the way 
firms normally transfer technologies, and the exploitability of results was judged on the 
basis of achievement of the projects' objectives.  To the extent these objectives or the 
direction of the finn's technology strategy shifted over time, the exploitability the 
interviewees attributed to the results depended on the extent the finn monitored strategi-
cally the project and was able to manage the interface between the project and its 
technology strategy. 
Collocation and separation of R&D and production activities offer different advant-
ages to different locations. For  example a number  of  firms preferred to leave development 
and testing activities to public research laboratories, in order not to "disrupt the operation 
of their production lines". However, this decision would delay the transfer of results to 
their production activities, and in a number of  projects timing was vecy important, as they 
were competing with similar  projects at other  parts of  the world. In  these cases collocation 
was essential for the rapid transfer of results to production. Some of these projects 
succeeded in moving faster than competition. Project design and management were very 
important in these cases. 
Project design, management, and the exploitabillty of  results 
Case 7: 
The coordinator who was the producer of a module was located virtually next to the 
user of the module who had the initial idea. As the project had to be multinational, they 
added a partner from a different country with another module which was not central to 
the operation of the system for the user, but was part of the demonstrator for the project. 
The central module aimed on its own at an innovation in the sense that it achieved 
performance that had not been achieved before, while it was known that a number of 
companies worldwide were investigating the area. The producer firm was small and its 
R&D and production activities were collocated. The project was very successful, and 
both modules delivered commercializable results. For the coordinator, its neighbouring 
location ~o the user was an important factor in this success. The fact that the project did 
involve limited inter-dependencies between the two producers also helped, as they both 
could orientate their efforts to producing functional modules rather than a functional 
system, in which they would have competing interests. 
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manage the collaboration-sensitive aspects of  their projects, and to move quickly towards 
their goals. In this project the collaboration-insensitive design allowed the partners to 
work quickly and effectively. It must be noted that the third partner acquired a patent on 
his/her module. Case 8 demonstrates the same point from a different angle. 
Case 8: 
Tiris project was initiated by a university and coordinated by a finn. Its collaboration-
sensitivities stemmed from the fact that the coordinator was a small firm and needed not 
so much external expertise as external effort, which meant that and potential competitors 
were involved. Thus, wanting to avoid leakages, the partners were left very much on  their 
own modules, until the demonstrator had to be prepared. Then compatibility problems 
emerged that took a long time to solve and when they did, the performance of the system 
was not as satisfactory as that of an American project on  the same topic. The project leader 
said that this was to be expected, as the American firm had as much money to do the 
project on its own, while the leader had to cooperate with another four organizations. 
Consortium agreements for joint exploitation of the results were an effective way of 
managing collaboration-sensitivities. In such cases, all partners had an interest in sys-
temic exploitation and potential competition was regulated at the outset. While in most 
consortia strong cases could be made for joint exploitation as partners had complementary 
expertise and complementary resources,  in only three cases was there clear initial 
commitment to engage in cooperative business ventures. All three projects were success-
ful.  However, only two of them seem to be moving towards joint exploitation. In the 
third, the Commission imposed an extra partner who in their tum decided to compete 
with the project coordinator. Thus, the project's modular results are currently marketed 
individually or in pairs, but not as part of the developed system. 
4.8 Modes of  exploitation 
Often the "exploitability" of R&D results is related to their quality (e.g. see: Fasella 
1988). While quality can relate to sets technical criteria, it must be noted that different 
such criteria apply, not only on different projects, but also on different partners within 
the same project. It is not only the difference between technical and economic success. 
These are often linked as the former is a precondition for the latter. It is also the criteria 
for technical success that differ between partners. This has been a fundamental element 
of the analysis so far presented. The distinction between collaboration-sensitive and 
-insensitive projects is based on  the way criteria for the success of a project are perceived. 
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criteria of the individual partners are. This provides the link with technology strategies, 
as these strategies determine those criteria. 
The way a  project fits  in the initiator's technology strategy determines whether 
systemic, modular or  potential exploitation is  being envisaged. To the extent that a project 
is collaboration-sensitive, success implies achievement of all secondary and tertiary 
technical objectives of its modules and sub-modules. Indeed, the possibility for systemic 
exploitation implies that the project is characterized as such in exploitation terms; that 
there is a systemic dimension in  the way  its modules relate to one another, which provides 
them with added value that cannot be exploited by means of exploiting individual 
modules. 
Systemic exploitation 
Systemic exploitation of  EC R&D project results occurs rarely for a number  of  reasons. 
The first is that the level of system development required in order to be exploitable is 
hardly ever attained during the lifespan of EC R&D projects. In most projects not all the 
performance targets were achieved. Furthennore, these performance targets rarely coin-
cided with real-life user requirements due to the pre-competitive character of EC R&D. 
Real-life user  requirements were targeted by user initiated projects. Five such projects 
were looked at.  In two of them the users were the coordinators. Both projects had 
problems in achieving their performance targets. One of  them was considered as a failure 
and its results were abandoned at least by the user initiator. The other was expected to 
last two years longer than anticipated, but at the time of the interview it was close to 
achieving performance objectives that would render it exploitable. This was largely due 
to changes in the directions of the project over time. Managing this change was helped 
by the fact that this project was based on a consortium agreement which provided for a 
joint venture that would exploit the results. 
In most cases, some shift in projects' directions and objectives seems to be related to 
their success. As in all three user-initiated but producer-coordinated projects, the system 
finally developed and exploited was quite different to the one initially envisaged. And 
while these differences affect the usability of  the system by  the user initiator, by  increasing 
the costs of re-tailoring the system to the specific needs of the specific user, they do not 
significantly affect the usability of the system in general. 
This points to a second reason for the rarity of systemic exploitation which is the way 
collaboration-sensitivities are  built into projects.  While collaboration-sensitivities in 
project implementation occur for all projects with systemic aims, the standard agreement 
provides exploitation rights to any of  the individual partners. However, systemic exploi-
tation by individual partners implies that each individual partner has all the expertise 
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or its collaboration-sensitivities lie in vertical relations. The former case was not met 
during this study,  as in collaboration-insensitive projects the interfaces between the 
modules are hardly developed to levels that would allow the system to be commercializ-
able. However, there were four cases of the latter, in which results of projects involving 
one producer and one or more users if commercializable could be  exploited by the 
producer. 
Horizontal collaboration-sensitivities in project implementation usually extend to 
exploitation. In only one case such collaboration-sensitivities were accompanied by a 
consortium agreement for joint exploitation, and this was the only such case of systemic 
exploitation. In  all other  such  cases, a consortium agreement on  this issue was not attained 
and there was only modular or potential exploitation. In one case a change of the 
composition of the consortium by the EC affected the possibilities for such consortium 
agreement. 
Modular exploitation 
For similar reasons, modular exploitation was not a frequent case either. It appeared 
in one collaboration-insensitive project which achieved a  "suitable" level of module 
development, and in one project with horizontal collaboration-sensitivities where the 
partners did not manage to achieve a consortium agreement for joint exploitation. The 
latter, however, is an exceptional case. Typically  horizontal collaboration-sensitivities 
restrict the compatibility of a project's modules with other systems to avoid potential 
competition. Thus, when such a project aims at producing an innovative system, com-
mercialization of  its modules is  related to commercialization of  the  system. 1bis  indicates 
the great economic importance of systemic exploitation. 
Potential exploitation 
A number of projects examined did not achieve a level of development "suitable" for 
exploitation. This "suitability" however, relates to the links between the technology 
strategy of  the  firm and  the  nature of  the results. A few projects aimed directly at "process" 
technologies which were not seen as commercializable, as the participating f11lllS did not 
follow a "network" type technology management and a "soft" strategy of commercializ-
ing such technologies.  These projects were successful in technical terms because of the 
identity of suppliers and users in the projects, and most of them led to internal use of the 
results by the participating firms. The results of the project referred to in case 1 were not 
exploited as the market scenario on which it was based did not materialize. 
In most cases process technologies were dealt with in the context of the product aims 
of the projects. In parallel with system or module development, suitable processes were 
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systems or modules was one of the ways of potential exploitation of results. 
Few of the firms  interviewed judged that commercialization of their modular or 
systemic results were worthy of internal development investment.  This was the case 
when project results were fitted well into the technology strategy of firms. Such were the 
cases of soft fmns pursuing a hardening strategy. Such were also cases of business units 
of large corporations. 
A number of firms, however, were looking for further development funds through 
participation in subsequent EC R&D projects. One of our cases was such a subsequent 
project. The use of the results of an EC R&D project to access more external R&D funds 
in order to develop these results further is one of  the most frequently met ways of  potential 
exploitation. It must be noted that this type of exploitation suits network type technology 
management and "soft" strategies, as for such finns technology development takes place 
only through external funds. This is their business. 
However, in a number of cases this development investment was not undertaken at 
all, while the projects achieved their technical objectives. This took place in projects the 
exploitability of which was  based on expectations which did not materialize.  New 
materials projects based on the expectation that the material at hand will become cheaper 
belong to this category. While the materials and the processes developed in the projects 
examined have applications, the difference in performance does not justify the difference 
in cost from working with conventional materials. This was often due to the fact that in 
the materials sector there is great technological inter-relatedness between processing 
stages creating indivisibilities as investment barriers. 
Potential exploitation applies in the cases where the project failed to lead to commer-
cializable results. Such failure implies the generation of knowledge and skills which 
would have been exploitable under certain conditions that have not materialized. These 
conditions concern either the level of technical development envisaged or the state of 
related markets. In the former, EC R&D projects enhance the level of knowledge and 
skills of firms, and thus bring them closer to attaining the level envisaged. In the latter, 
EC R&D projects create technologies that could be exploitable under different states of 
markets, which may well materialize. 
In  any case, two factors affect largely the extent to which potentially exploitable results 
are achieved. The first  is the way the relationship between a finn's technology and 
business  strategy  interact.  Network  type  technology  management clearly facilitates 
commercialization of EC R&D results. The second is the way collaboration-sensitivities 
are managed within a project. Finns that managed their collaboration well were very 
effective in benefiting from their EC R&D projects. In relation to this, all interviewees 
stressed the importance of the experience gained in "international project management", 
which allows them to do "good business" within the framework of changing inter-institu-
tional  relations  in the  1990's. And being  successful  in benefiting from  Framework 
Programme projects is a "good business". 
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This section reappraises the analysis and summarizes the  emerging  firm-related factors 
that affect the impact of the Framework Programme on European industry. While the 
focus on  fum-related factors, necessarily emphasizes the individuality of  each  case, some 
general points about the impact of  the Framework programme on categories of  firms can 
be drawn and are presented in the first subsection. The second sub-section summarizes 
the factors that affected the success of the projects and the exploitation of their results. 
Finally attempts to draw lessons for the Commission as a sponsor of either industrial 
R&D, or evaluations of its industrial impact. 
5.1. The Framework Programme and European Industry 
A look at the literature on EC sponsored R&D shows the multiplicity of motives and 
benefits that encourage firms to participate in EC R&D  activities.  The concept of 
technology strategy has been introduced to analyze these motives and perceived benefits. 
Technology strategy involves the vision of  a firm about directions in which technologies, 
relevant to its businesses, develop, together with its technological activities to position 
itself favourably within competition in these businesses. Technology strategy has been 
identified as a major factor involved in the exploitation of EC R&D results.' 
Technology management can be seen as a subset of technology strategy. However, it 
incorporates the structural characteristics of a finn which relate to strategy. The technol-
ogy  management modes of  the  firms investigated, were analyzed in  relation to three broad 
types: networks (business based on technology exploitation), machines (business based 
on production and technology management functions to that end) and portfolios (tech-
nology management based on ad hoc balancing production and technology acquisition). 
These  types indicate ways in which finns position themselves in relation to  technological 
changes and the way in which they move to exploit technology in the market-place. 
The Framework Programme had a  lot of response from  firms,  as well as other 
organizations, which follow a network type technology management, that is which sell 
technologies rather than, or as well as, products.  For these organizations the Framework 
Programme provides a business environment that orientates their technology strategies, 
and a facility to make the contacts necessary for their business. 
The Framework programme undoubtedly played a major role in the recent growth in 
"soft firms"  (i.e. firms that commercialize of technology and develop customized pro-
ducts) which manage technology in a network fashion. As these firms commercialize 
technologies at a very fast pace (each project has to lead to commercialized outputs), they 
43 enhance the availability of technologies in the market, enhancing thus the innovative 
potential of European industry as a whole. 
The other side of the coin is the destabilization of markets, on which the strategies of 
these finns are based. Standardization problems are increasing for the users of their 
outputs, as each commercialized output is individual.  User firms can easily become 
locked-into technology producer firms.  The standardization aspects of the EC pro-
grammes are very important in this respect. 
The Framework Programme, together with the plethora of technologies in the market 
resulting from the activities of these organizations, plays a major role in directing and 
facilitating the innovative efforts of finns with technology management of the machine 
type. However, as these finns are normally not very  c~pable  in leading edge technologies 
their participation in framework programme is often accompanied with problems in the 
exploitation of the results. 
For large corporations with portfolio type technology management, the Framework 
Programme has little direct influence on their technology strategies. One of its main 
"strategic" effects lies in the fact that, through the subsidy, it provides their corporate 
R&D laboratories with more room to manoeuvre in terms of both developing certain 
technologies and personnel management 
The subsidy provided by EC programmes is of great importance. EC programmes 
have often provided to firms who  ·did not perform R&D with the stimulus for to do so, 
by allowing a financial critical mass to be established. 
Furthermore, some  finns reported that they learned a lot  about managing projects from 
the Commission's scientific officers.  The staff of ESPRIT seems to warrant special 
mention here,  as their commitment to monitoring the projects and enforcing strict 
management rules was emphasized in many cases as one of  the factors that helped project 
management a lot. 
Project management in general was one of the areas in which EC programmes seem 
to have affected the knowledge-base of all participants. Irrespective to the success or 
failure of  their projects the interviewees stressed that through their projects they are better 
prepared for all aspects related to their participation, from writing proposals to screening 
partners and managing their collaborations. In some cases it was emphasized that having 
a proposal accepted in one programme opens the door for more to come. This has to do 
with a number of factors, such as becoming known to the bureaucracy, and becoming 
known as a good partner within the networks of organizations which work under the 
various programmes. 
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As CEC (1992-a) argued the willingness and ability of partners to exploit the results 
of R&D is not analogous to their exploitability. Indeed, there are problems in dealing 
with the exploitability of EC R&D results as it cannot be defined in an objective way. 
Exploitability depends on the technology strategies of the participant finns. For example 
for finns with network type technology management virtually all results are exploitable. 
Projects are designed aiming at product and/or process technologies. Only a few cases 
were examined in which the projects aimed solely at process technologies. In these cases 
the participating organizations aimed at using the results themselves. These projects were 
successful in technical terms, but their results were not always exploited. In one of these 
cases the results were commercialized because of a radical change iri corporate strategy 
due to a take-over. In  another the results were kept "on the shelf" in case the organization 
needed them in the future. The difference in technology management patterns played an 
obvious role. The first was a firm with network type technology management while the 
second with portfolio type. 
In most cases, however, the projects incorporated both product and process goals. 
According to the importance of collaboration for the achievement of the product goals 
of  the project leader (which was the organization interviewed) projects were distinguished 
between the categories collaboration-sensitive and collaboration-insensitive. In some 
cases there were partners within the consortia who were users of the projects' systemic 
or modular goals. For them, these projects were always collaboration-sensitive as their 
success depended on the work of the other partners. 
The collaboration-sensitivity of the project was a major factor in  the choice of  partners. 
The more sensitive the project the more the technical ability of  the partners was important. 
The more insensitive the project the greater the importance attached to the origin of the 
partners, which was perceived as an important political factor increasing or decreasing 
the possibilities to get EC funding. Still, the quality of  the communications infrastructure 
in less favoured regions of the Community, as well as the financial viability of their 
industries emerged as important factors influencing decisions to collaborate with finns 
from these regions. 
Collaboration-sensitivities were also important in project design. The design of the 
project had to strike a balance that would satisfy the goals of the Programme, the goals 
of the initiator and the goals of the partners. A number of organizations design largely 
collaboration-insensitive projects, in which they perform the parts that are important for 
their technology strategy. This means that they do not engage in projects that involve 
"radical"  changes in their technologies as  they have the capabilities to perform the 
projects, or  the parts of projects, they are interested in. It appeared that in Germany there 
is a cultural commitment in this type of project design. 
45 However, increasing the dependence of the goals of the partners on the goals of the 
initiator provided the means for controlling the direction of the overall project and for 
restricting potential competition. Limits to this were posed by the size of the initiating 
firm and the extent of work it could perform. Academic partners were often chosen to 
perform important parts of  the  projects in view of  their low potential for competition after 
the project 
Detailed consortium agreements were often signed to guarantee the coincidence of 
goals between the partners and the initiator and to limit potential competition. However, 
patents previous to the projects were the most effective means to that end. User finns had 
a stronger incentive to engage in the formulation of detailed consortium agreements as 
their benefits depended almost entirely on the work of  the other partners. 
It appeared that all the organizations acknowledged that the goals of all projects shift 
in  time as a result of  the partners' changing strategies as well as of new data arising from 
project implementation. A number of  projects collapsed under  these changes. To keep the 
right balance between the goals of  the actors involved under changing conditions was the 
role of project management, and the more the dependencies between the partners the 
more difficult it is. 
Three ways of  dealing effectively with changes in projects' direction were found. The 
first, which seems to characterize the culture of Danish firms, is to make sure that there 
is a consensus between consortium members on all technical decisions that may affect 
the directions of the project. While this requires a large coordination effort it seems to 
pay off as no decision is taken until the right balance is struck. The second is to start the 
project with a consortium agreement providing for  joint  exploitation of  its systemic goals. 
Thus, the goals of each partner coincide with the goals of the project and each shift in 
direction takes place in order  to increase the commercializability of  systemic results. The 
third approach refers to  the  internal project management structures of  finns. In  some cases 
firms manage the interface between their technology strategy and the directions of the 
project by launching, when necessary, internal projects interfacing between the two. This 
is done with the help of a specialized department that liaises between  the people working 
on the project and the partners. This is also an effective means to control the technology 
flows from the firm to the other parties involved. 
In  general technology flows within the consortia did not appear to be more than what 
was required for project implementation. The results shared within the whole of a 
consortium are typically codifiable, and again these are shared only to the extent they 
will not create potential for competition between partners. Greater flows than required 
for project implementation were found in only one case involving an inter-organizational 
research team which worked together in all partners' locations at the various stages of 
the project. It is important to note that this case was governed by a consortium agreement 
for joint exploitation of the results. 
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product developers and top managers to the particular projects. The smaller the ttrmS and 
the more informal their structures, the more results were communicated and screened, 
and the more product developers and top managers were informed. In large corporations 
the interest of product divisions and top managers in the projects was by definition low, 
as their investment in EC sponsored projects was limited (the EC payed for some of it). 
Furthermore, often within the structures of large corporations it is the job of the R&D 
department to develop fully the results, even when the project is contracted for by  product 
divisions. The less the investment of a product division on the EC project, the more it is 
up to the R&D department to demonstrate its value. One such case, in which a product 
division revealed great interest, was a project developing the results of a previous one, 
which had demonstrated their value for this product division's activities. When product 
divisions have a great interest in a project they usually participate in it as partners. 
Cases  of commercialization of product technologies developed by the EC R&D 
projects were characterized by strategic commitment and good management within the 
finn as well as the consortium. Obviously, the last factor was less important in collabor-
ation-insensitive projects. In many cases the level of development reached was hardly 
adequate for commercialization, in accordance to the pre-competitiveness principle. 
The extent to which further development was needed for commercialization varied 
significantly. However, the size of  :the investment required was not directly related to the 
willingness of finns to undertake it. This willingness was stronger in firms following a 
"hardening" strategy, which in all such cases examined was based on the results of their 
EC projects. In many cases, the development needed was planned to take place within 
subsequent EC projects. 
Using the results of a project to get funding for subsequent projects is one of  the ways 
of potentially exploiting EC R&D results. Even in the absence of a directly subsequent 
project, great value is attached by  the firms to process and training results of  such projects. 
One of  the most important aspects of  training is the accumulation of "international project 
management" skills which seem to be important for the ways business practices develop 
in Europe. 
Finally, even in  cases of  failure to exploit the results, potential exploitation still applies. 
This is because failure implies knowledge and skills gained which are exploitable under 
certain technological and/or market conditions which do not materialize.  EC R&D 
projects enhance the level of knowledge and skills of firms, and thus bring them closer 
to attaining desired technological development levels. They also generate technologies 
that could be exploitable under different market conditions, which may well materialize. 
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5.3. Concluding Lessons 
On the basis of the analysis the following lessons can be drawn: 
i) The technology strategies of actors that participate in consortia are a key factor in 
the exploitability of EC R&D results. The way in which finns perceive their EC R&D 
projects in relation to their business determines the directions they will pursue in project 
implementation and exploitation. Technology strategies also play a key role the design 
of projects and consortia and affect the ways project are managed. The dissemination of 
results also serves these strategies. Studies of the industrial impact of EC R&D pro-
grammes have to take this into account 
ii) The Framework Programme has promoted a fierce competitive environment in the 
markets for technology, as it provided business opportunities to technology producers. 
While this supported finns which engage in contract development, competition created 
pressures for such firms to engage in production. Thus the Framework Programme has 
provided not only for a quantitative growth in the technological base of  the Community, 
but also for a qualitative improvement relating to the innovativeness of an important part 
of the Community's technological potential. 
iii)  The Framework Programme offers opportunities also to technology users to 
develop technological capabilities and strategies.  However, the host of technologies 
generated creates problems in the development of technology strategies by users, and 
even more problems to users without technology strategies, who operate in a rapidly 
changing environment.  In this respect, there may be a  role for the Community in 
intensifying its standardization efforts to reduce this type of problems. Complementary 
to this can be assistance to firms to develop technological capabilities and strategies and 
to understand the changes required by the competitive environment of the 1990's. 
iv)  Noting the inadequacy of the various dissemination fora to effect technology 
transfer from firms that perfonn projects to their audience, commercial exploitation is 
the principle means of dissemination of  EC R&D projects' results. In this sense there can 
be arguments either for stricter rules governing dissemination, or for R&D closer to the 
market. Nonetheless, in view of the existing pre-competitiveness principle that covers 
EC R&D projects, firms with network type technology management clearly play an 
important role in the economy of the Community. 
48 v) The importance of collaboration for project implementation and exploitation, can 
be seen as adding value by increasing the productivity of the R&D process. On the other 
hand, collaboration-sensitivity poses great problems in project management especially 
when shifts in the goals of the project and/or the strategies of firms occur. To the extent 
that the Community's programmes aim to increase the productivity of the R&D process, 
collaboration-sensitivity can find a place in project selection criteria. However, further 
research is required to determine the way collaboration-sensitivity applies in various 
collaborative structures, the way levels of  collaboration-sensitivity can be identified, and 
the way they can be related to programme objectives. 
vi) Finally, as far as the ability of f11111S to exploit EC R&D results is concerned, it 
must be noted that indeed EC projects are different from companies' wholly self-financed 
projects and that effective exploitation of their results requires different management 
patterns. Firms which realized this, have been very effective in exploiting EC R&D 
results. The ability of firms to realize such differences and respond by establishing 
appropriate R&D management processes, depends very much  on  company size, structure, 
management style and culture.  However, such changes are very important as in an 
evolving world change is often synonymous to survival. 
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Sample description ,} 
2 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15. 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Sample description: Description of the . 
organizations interviewed 
Type of  organization  Technology  . 
...  ement 
Sector 
small F'mn (30 employeeS)  Network  Telecom I Electronics 
Srnall Firm (20 employees)  Network  IT I consultancy 
SME (400 employees)  Network  IT Sy  .,~1.114> 
Collective agency  Network  Mechanical 
Engineering 
Small firm (15 employees)  Network I Hardening  · 
transition 
IT systems 
Small firm (15 employees)  Network  IT I consultancy 
Large Business unit of  Transitional involving  Semiconductors I 
corporation (500 employees)  Machine and network  engineering 
characteristics 
Large Corporate R&D  Portfolio I Network  Electronics 
Large Corporate R&D  Portfolio  Machinery 
Lar~e (5000 employees)  Network I hardening 
transition 
IT systems I packages 
Small (35 employees)  Network I hardening  Telecom I 
transition  Engineering 
Small (30 employees)  Network/ hardening 
transition 
Robotics I engineering 
Large (7000 employees)  Network  IT systems 
Large business unit of  Transitional involvirtg  Electrical 
corp:>ration (6000  network and portfolio 
employees)  characteristics 
Large (5000 employees)  Machine  Textiles 
SME (285 employees)  Machine in softening 
transition 
Aerospace 
~ 
Large (100000 employees)  ·Portfolio  Textiles diversified 
SME (120 employees)  Network  Engineering 
SME (105 employees)  Network I portfolio  Biotechnology 
Large  teR&D  Portfolio  Many 
Large l.:f.'HIJI.Jiate R&D  Portfolio  Metals 
Collective agency  Network  M~erals 
55 
I 23  SME (300 employees)  Network  IT systems 
24  Small firm (60 employees)  Network  IT systems 
25  SME (100 employees)  Network  Engineenng 
26  Collective  Network  Minerals 
27  Large c~te  ·  proc!uction  Portfolio  IT/el~nics 
and logistics centre (700 
employees) 
28  Large business unit of  Portfolio  IT 
ll.tion  · 
29  Large business unit of  Portfolio  Semiconductors 
~___l'VlAtion 
30  Business unti (900  ·portfoilo  IT 
employees) of a \.0\JI. yva.Ation  : 
31  Large business unit of  Portfolio  Seminconductors 
'-'VliJUI.AtiOn  · 
32  Corporate research centre  Portfolio  IT/consumer 
electronics 
33  Large business unit of a  Portfolio  Telecommunications 
corp:ntion (18,000 
employees) 
34  SME (200 employees)  Network  Software engineering, 
consulting 
35  c'",. ~Jil!,te research lab  Portfolio  IT/electronics 
36  C~te  research centre  Portfolio  Non~ferous metals 
(25  employees)  - ·  . industry  ' 
37  Corporate R&D centre  Portfolio  Construction industry. 
38  Corporate R&D centre  Portfolio 
/ 
A  viation/aeronauties 
39  SME (8 employees)  Network 
I  Software engineering 
40  SME (50 employees)  Network  Software engineering 
41  Large business unit (6,300  Portfolio  Telecommunications 
employees) of a corporation 
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1. Introduction 
This study 
11Techno1ogy Transfer within Firms (German Main Contractors of EC 
Projects)  u is part of  Element 5 of  the study "Horizontal Evaluation of  the Industrial Impact 
of EC R&D Programmes".  It focusses on the hypothesis that whatever the technical 
achievements may be, a key barrier in European finns to exploitation of R&D results lies 
in the functioning of the interface between those carrying out R&D and those responsible 
for application and marketing of the results. 
This part of the overall study investigated R&D projects within firms co-funded under 
the EC Framework Programme and conducted by German firms as main contr(!ctor and · 
·concentrated on the following questions: 
•  How is research and development organized within the firm? 
•  How does the transfer of knowledge from R&D to the production units take 
place within the firm? 
•  How did the idea for the R&D project arise? 
•  What technical, economic and other results was the R&D aiming at? 
•  How were these results applied and/or marketed, and what factors had a 
·  negative influence on this? 
•  What role did EC policy measures play in the firm's innovation proce5s? 
57 FhG-ISI questioned 15 firms in Germany which had participated as main contractors 
in the ESPRIT Programme (9 firms), the BRITE/EURAM Programme (5 firms) and in 
the RACE Programme  (1  firm).  The idea of looking only at  main contractors is a 
compromise due io funding restraints and the thought that the main contractor may gain 
the largest part of the benefits from an EC project. 
Information was gathered through semi-structured  face-to-face  interviews which 
lasted between two and five hours. If available we expanded these interviews with 
information from the annual reports of the firms  and the final  project reports.· The 
interviewees were the project leaders and the heads of research. The projects were either 
already completed or  were coming to a close. In  some cases the project had finished four 
years before, which had the advantage that possible applications or marketable uses of 
the project results could be investigated. However, people interviewed in connection with 
these less recent projects often had difficulties in remembering exact details of how the 
project had arisen and developed. 
It was difficult to arrange interviews with suitable partners: one problem W!15  that 
especially in  the case of  less recent projectS the responsible project leaders were no longer 
working for the same firm or in the same department. In these cases the firms and 
responsible successors were unwilling to give an interview. If the selected project had 
already been a subject of other EC evaluation studies, interviews were not given either. 
The responsible project leaders did not see why they should be questioned several times 
on the  .same topic, and complained about frequent questioning by various institutes and . 
consulting bureaux for studies commissioned by the EC  .. Firms were also less willing to 
discuss when the project could not be used for publicity, or when its strategic importance 
for the firm was assessed as being very low. Thus the concentration of our investigation 
on the EC programmes ESPRIT and BRI1E/EURAM was not deliberate, but arose 
because a sufficient number of interviews with leaders of projects from the RACE and 
DRIVE programmes could not be arranged. 
The following results relate to the 15 EC projects and the evaluation of the intervie\\rs 
conducted; they do not constitute in-depth studies, nor can ·they be considered to be 
representative  . 
. We confined the interviews to·a consideration of technology transfer within the firm. 
The results of the EC project as a whole, and the importance of the cooperation of the 
consortium for the success of  the project, were examined only to the extent that appeared 
necessary to us in order to describe ·the transfer of technology ·within the firm and the 
· exploitation of results.  Moreover, the aspect of cooperation -between partners in EC 
projects is examined more closely in element 7 of the overall study. 
Of the  15  · R&D establishments 'vhich  carried out the EC  R&D  proj~ts in our 
investigation, 12 belong to multinational enterprises (MNE). These are active in the fields 
of telecommunications, semiconductors, image processing, sensors, multimedia, electro-
nics,  aluminium  production  and conStruction  engineering.  Only three of the R&D 
establishments investigated belonged to small or medium sized firms  (SME); these 
58 - developed software and supplied engineering services. 
The letters in italics mark examples from our interviews which illustrate the gener-
alized results of our investigation. 
2. Internal Technology Transfer and R&D· Management 
Structure 
We understand technology transfer within the finn as the transfer of technical and 
scientific knowledge from one area of the enterprise to another, and its application in new 
products or  processes. Two types of  transfer, vertical and horizontal, can be  distinguished: · 
Vertical technology transfer follows the various stages of the innovation process, from 
research and  dev~lopment through production, diffusion and economic exploitation. 
Horizontal technology transfer denotes the transfer of  knowledge between organizational 
units of an enterprise (e.g. research laboratory and business units), between enterprises 
or between branches of industry. 
A distinction also has to be made between demand-induced R&D and technology-
pushed R&D. The  demand-induced R&D is  carried out  in  response to an external stimulus 
by a {potential} user. Since there is a recognized need for a new product or  new process, 
·there are forces acting to pull the R&D project along and the risk of failure may be 
frequently  lower than for  technology-pushed  R&D.  The forces  which give rise to 
technology-pushed R&D projects arise within R&D as a development of  the areas of 
expertise \vhich grow  over a length of  time  and are likely to  be far riskier  than  demand-pull 
R&D. In our investigation we found both demand-pull and technology-pushed R&D 
projects. 
2.1 Technology strategies and location·ofEC projects 
Technology strateg\es of  the large companies 
The technology strategy of the large companies investigated was directed towards 
global markets; technological requirements demanded a broad scientific base for research 
and development. The large companies concentrated on main points in selected areas of 
technology (key areas) in which they aimed at a technology leading position. Due to the 
necessity for this scientific research and development basis, national and international 
cooperations with other firms' R&D laboratories, with universities, publicly supported 
R&D institutes and other companies were regarded as an important part of technology 
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strategy. The aims of these cooperations were to transfer externally available know-how 
to one's own company and to exchange infonnation. To assist these technology strategies 
based on the transfer of knowledge and the exchange of information, large companies 
made deliberate use of national and international R&D programmes. Generally, the 
technology strategies of these large companies could be characterized as follows: 
•  Market leadership in key technology areas through concerted R&D activities, 
•  internal research and development in R&D centres and in the R&D 
departments of the various business units, 
•  external cooperations with wliversities, publicly supported R&D institutes 
(such as e.g. the Fraunhofer Institutes, big research institutions, public testfug 
centres), R&D laboratories of  other finns and with other firms as such, 
• _  European and international orientation of research and development activities. 
The R&D projects supported by Brussels served as a catalyst for the cooperation of 
the large companies with European universities and firms. The large companies inves-
tigated only applied for EC projects if they suited their technol9gy strategy and their 
. product portfolio. For this reason the EC support could not generate new ideas but  joined' 
existing R&D activities. 
Technology strategies of  the SMEs 
The three SMEs also conducted their own R&D efforts but performed R&D as part 
of their business activities without a R&D department detached from other operating 
departments. The main emphasis was on development activities. These SMEs were 
specialized in the development of new  and  iQtproved  customized software and in 
professional services such as consulting, training and customized problem solving of 
software applications in  working processes. They also engaged in external cooperations 
with other firms, universities and publicly supported R&D institutes which is a fact of 
growing importance in  Gennany (e.g. Kuhlmann/Kuntze: R&D cpoperation by  small and 
medium sized companies, 1991). A crucial role for the SMEs' collaboration strategy,._was 
played by firms from the industrial and services sector as potential users of  their softWare. 
In addition these SMEs aimed at a technology leading position and oriented their 
technology strategy towards the  European  market.  There  are two reasons for this 
European orientation: one is that the three SMEs already had a good mark:et position 
within Germany and were thus searching for new markets. The other reason is that the 
three firms were all participants in networks of firms which themselves had a European 
or international orientation, v.rhich is not representative for German SMEs. For instance, 
one small engineering firm is engaged in ship-building and has worldwide contacts with 
60 internationally active shipbuilders. The second firm, an engineering bureau, develops 
_  software for the founchy industry; it has customers in the USA, Canada, the Philippines, 
Japan, Korea, China and both eastern and western Europe. The third firm is embedded  -
in a network of  enterprises from the automobile industry and related suppliers, and besides 
. activities in. other business areas is d~veloping software for CIM applications for these 
branches. 
These existing "European oriented business networks" shaped the basis for "European 
oriented R&D networks". Partners of these business networks applied for EC support as 
parts of existing networks. The EC projects encouraged these network-relationships on 
European level and favoured the enlargement of the business networks with R&D 
activities. 
Location of EC projects 
The EC piojects were carried out in different operational contexts. Of the 15 R&D 
projec!S studied, 
•  six were conducted in a central R&D unit at corporate level or in a central 
R&D laboratory, 
•  six were performed in the R&D department of the firms, 
•  the three SMEs operated R&D as part of their business activities and had no 
sep~te  R&D department. 
The central R&D laboratories and central R&D units of the large COIJlpanies  are 
engaged in applications-oriented research which they themselves described as "  ... basic 
research  oriented towards possible uses".  Their aim is to gain new knowledge for 
previously defined application purposes. These six EC projects had a clearly precom~ 
petitive character and were aiming at basic acquisitions for a specific purpose: new 
-materials, technological processes, process technologies, concepts and methods whose 
suitability for commercial exploitation had yet to be demonstrated. 
The further removed the R&D projects were from the corporate level of the central 
R&D laboratories or central-R&D units of the companies, and the more they took place_  -
in the R&D department or as part of  the SMEs' buSiness activities, the more the character 
of the project departed from this pattern. Development activities and direct transfer of 
the results into marketable products came into the foreground. Thus, for instance, the 
three SMEs developed software solutions that matched the requirements of the users, 
who themselves tested and used the programmes_ in their design and/or manufacturing 
departments. The area of such projects was very close to the market or to the stage of 
industrial development and the boundaries between the so-called precompetitive and 
,  competitive area were shifting. 
61 2.2 Origin of  project ideas 
At what management level do the ideas for R&D projects arise ? What role is played 
by internal users such as production units of the finn ? What role is played by users of 
new technologies in the generation of ideas ? 
In approximately half the EC projects examined, the ideas came from the R&D unit 
in which the EC project was subsequently perfonned. The projects were clearly teCh-
nology-pushed and were based on  technology lines already present in the R&D laboratory 
or the business unit Thus EC support did not have an "initiator" function for the R&D 
project. 
For instance the idea for a project was generated in the central research laboratory 
of  a large company.  The technical experts in  ·th~ research  laboratol)~ and the head of  the 
research depanment assessed the technological trend and discussed proposals; market 
studies or trend prognost:S were not peiformed, and were not considered helpful. Within · 
so-called. ''project reviews" proposals  are  discussed and compared with  the  overall 
research strategy and  p_roduct strategy of  the company. The idea for the EC project arose 
from general consideration of  a problem and the goals were first fonnulated in general 
tenns:  in  the field  of multimedia,  communication  ·was  to  be  made  visually  and a 
contribution was to be made to reducing costs. In the responsible research group of  the 
rese~rch laboratory  these general notions  were then  converted into  technologically 
realizable-aims.  The project was based on a technology line that was already followed 
by the research group, and had technological/inks wi!h other EC projects. 
The p~ocess of idea generation in the EC projects carried out by the three software 
firms,  on the other hand, was quite different. The development firms  were  a~are of 
customer-specific problems and requirements. On their initiative, the project content was 
more or less jointly developed and submitted for- EC support. The software firms placed 
a high value on the generation of ideas; nevertheless the project idea was discussed at an 
early stage with the customer, with whom the firm was already in contact. Thus the project 
idea was developed in interaction between software developers and users. In these three 
EC  projects,  both the developer and  the user were subsequently  represented  in the 
consortium. The group of potential users was also extended to include firms outside the 
consqrtium  and  with which  the  developers  had  had  previous  contacts  or customer 
relations. 
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• In another case the initial impulse for a project came from a different direction. 
The initiative for the R&D project came from a public testing centre which brought 
the idea to the firm.  There were already good personal contacts between the two actors; 
the idea was the_n developed in a  process of  continuous interaction between both partners. 
The firm took over the role of  the main contractor; while the testing centre defined the 
technical requirements '!nd supervised their  fulfilment~ 
The idea and the selection ·of an EC project could also be made via a "top down 
approach". Some large companies maintained EC offices in Brussels. In one case the 
initiative for an EC project was taken by the company's EC off,ice in Brussels which 
passed the project idea on from there to the head of the central R&D unit, where it was 
examined and passed on to the responsibl~ specialist department 
Another example for a "top down approach"  described an EC project which was 
initiated by the management on corporate level and represented a strategic significance 
for the company. This project was then passed on to the responsible business unit of the 
MNE and performed in the R&D department. 
2.3 Different types of  technology transfer within firms 
·  Technology transfer within firms varies according to the organization of research and 
development  within the firm. In  the 15 EC projects investigated, three types of  technology 
transfer could be distinguished. Their characterization depended on the location in  which 
the EC projects were carried out, and on the division of work between research and 
development and the other functions of the firm. We identified the following types: 
•  R&D at corporate level, 
•  R&D in a R&D department of a business unit, 
•  R&D as part of the business/production activities. 
1)'Pe 1: R&D at corporate level 
Of the 15 EC projects questioned, 6 were performed at corporate level in a central 
R&D laboratory or  central R&D unit, with subsequent technology transfer to  the business 
'units. The MNEs maintained at corporate level either central R&D labs or central R&D 
units; the latter were part of other corporate divisions. The domain of the corporate R&D 
was in applied research. The type of R&D of the EC projects also was  ·applied research 
and the project idea mainly was tec~ology-pushed; 
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'J)pe  1~ R&D at corporate level 
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For instance, one EC  proJect was earned out in the central R&D laboratory of  a MNE 
(see figure 1).  Research and development constituted a central part of  the corporate 
strategy of  the MNE. The intention was to create synergetic effects by the centralization 
of R&D activities;  thus  half of  all R&D tasks  were performed in  the central R&D 
laboratory. Approximately 70% of  the finance for. the laboratory was provided by the 
individual business u_nits and about 3090 by the board for cross-depaitmental project 
topics. About_ two-thirds of  the main activities of  the central research laboratory were 
strategic projects; the remaining third was made up of  service activities such as measur-
ing, testing and laboratory services, available to the operative units.  The strategic R&D 
projects were developed by the central R&D laboratory in accordance with the predeter-
mined strategic orientation of  the M!VE,  i.e. the R&D laboratory often played a prelimi-
nary initiation  role  subsequently discussing  and defining  the project ideas  with  the 
business units. 
The EC project "'as concerned with applied research in the area of  new materials, 
and was ca"ied out in order to increase inrernal competence in this area. The technical 
project goals could onlY be achieved using new materials.  The EC project was intended· 
at that time to build up the strategically important area-of new materials in the hope of 
gaining new customers and opening up new markets. At that time the EC  project was part 
of  the core R&D of  the research centre and was based on the existing strategic technology 
line. It should be stated at  the outset that the idea of  gaining new markets was not realized, 
as the new materials subsequently lost sign(ficance and potential customers did not show 
the degree of  acceptance hoped for. 
64 The idea for the EC project came from a manufacturing firm which approached the 
central R&D laboratory because of  existing personal contacts. In close liaison between 
both people the project idea was more specifically defined, and project leadership was 
given to the central R&D laboratory (see .figure 1). 
Within  the project consortium  work  was divided as follows:  the  research  centre 
developed alloys, and sent them to the manufacturing .firm, which then converted them 
into powder and  forwarded th~  powder to the two universities for testing. These informed 
the finn of  the test results.  The powder was then given back by  the manufacturing finn 
to the research centre, which used it to make semi-finished products. The research centre 
then manufactured a limited number of  improved semi-finished products as prototypes. 
These prototypes were given to  potential customers for testing. Cu.stomer interest in the 
prototypes declined,  however; because the prices were too ·high.  The technical goals of 
the EC project were achieved and the technologica{ competitive position of  the company 
improved. However, the project results were not converted into marketable products due 
to lack of  demand.  There was no transfer of  products to the business units of  the MNE, 
only a transfer of  knowledge. _The research  work on the new 1naterials induced new 
awareness in the research centre of  the use of  conventional 1naterials: Because of  the 
poor sales chances of  the. new materials, an investigation is now taking place to find out 
whether the  characteristics aimed at with  the new materials  might not after all be 
achieved using conventional materials. 
It was not due to lack of technology transfer within. the firm or bern'een the partners 
that the EC project did not lead to a marketable product. The cause is to be found rather 
in an erroneoU$  assessment of the market potential of the new materials, as possible 
customers were not prepared to pay higher prices for better semi-finished products. 
'J)'pe 2: R&D in a R&D department of  a busin~  unit 
Six EC projects were conducted in the R&D departments of MNEs' business units, 
which were directed much more intensely towards product  and process development than 
towards applied research. The project ideas were mainly technology-pushed, even if there 
was an interaction between the R&D department and the other operating departments of 
the business unit. 
The following example describes the process of technology transfer of an EC project 
within a business unit of a MNE. All in  all, the aims set for this EC project were achieved, 
the new elements were manufactured and were used in products. The idea for the project 
was technology-pushed. Cooperation between the manufacturing unit and the R&D 
department obviously presented no problem within the. business unit. However, some 
problems existed betw~n  ~e  participating firms, because they were direct competitors 
-in this field. 
65 Figw-e2: 
'I)'pe 2: R&D Department of  a Business Unit 
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The business unit had its own R&D department,  worlcing in close collaboration with 
manufacturing (see figure 2).  R&D activity concentrated on development.  Due to the 
technical requimments  (semiconductors)  the  R&D  unit was closely associated with 
manufacturing; thus the strategy was to ·develop, from present production, pilot lines for 
prodUCtion and new products. Technology de1-·elopment was carried out  for the unit~  own 
products and for other business units  within the MNE.  The R&D department of  the 
·b"usiness unit collaborated closefy with the central R&D unit at a corporate level and 
obtained the necessary basic knowledge from the central unit.  This close collaboration 
also applied to the elaboration of  project proposals and the acquisition Qf EC R&D 
projects. The technOlogy strategy focused on internal research and development and on 
cooperation with the central R&D unit 
The proposal  for  the EC  project was developed by the R&D department of  the business 
unit itself (see figure 2); the R&D department scanned the call for papers and the main 
topics of  the EC framework programmes for possible project contracts which might fall 
within their field of  activi!)'.  However; proposals for projects supported by the EC were 
also passed on to the business unit~ department by the central R&D unit. 
The aim of  the R&D department in participating in the EC project was to continue its 
technologic(zl development. line in a particular business area.  The EC project was in a 
technologic(zl core area of  the business unit and was based on already existing technology 
lines,· several ''forerunner" technologies were already present. Thus the EC  support did 
not initiate the R&D project, which would in all probability have been carried out anyway 
without support as it was in a core area of  the enterprise. The generation of  ideas was 
66 also strongly technology-pushed, but with collaboration and mutual adjustment of  R&D 
and manufacturing. 
The technical goals of  the EC  project were achieved. In a new pilot line in the business 
unit the new elements were produced and used in entertainment electronics and advanced 
computers.  The newly-developed elements were also used in production by the partner 
firm. However c9operation proved diffzcult, as the two firms are direct competitors. Thus 
cooperation was characterized by the fear that too-much Jcnow-how might be transferred 
to the other firm. 
1YJ>e 3: R&D as part of the business/production activities 
The three small and medium sized software (engineering) firms had no separa~e  R&D 
department and carried out the EC projects as part of their business/production activities. 
This type described here should demonstrate that where there was a relationship between 
develoj>er and (potential) user, the project ideas were not-or hardly-technology-pushed, 
compared v:.~ith the other two types. The idea for the development project was demand~ 
induced and elaborated jointly and interactively by the users and the software developer. 
This interaction between them enabled the requirements of the firms to be taken into 
account, so that the project was very strongly customer- and application-oriented. The 
interplay between actors enabled the software programmes to be tested under manufac-
turing conditions and optimized. The EC  projects of this type were very close to the 
market and to the stage of industrial development, which was in conflict with the existing 
idea 9f precompetitive EC support. 
Figure 3: 
Type 3: R&D as part of  the business ·production activities 
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training and 
educat1on One  EC project  we  investigated  was  carried out  in  the  area  of software  by an 
engineering bureau as 11Ulin contractor (see figure 3). The finn had eight employees, four 
of  them engaged in software development activities. The developers were concerned with 
the analysis of  11Ulnufacturing processes and the definition, development and implemen~ 
tation of  software solutions.  The engineering bureau was a world market leader in the 
area of  computerized casting simulations for the foundry industry. By taking part in EC 
projects it wished to improve its market position in the EC even further, as it already had 
a very good 11Ulrket position in Germany.  The technology strategy aimed at a leading 
position in computer aided simulation, internal development activities and international 
cooperation with universities and industrial enterprises. 
The EC project was based on the existing technology line and was highly important 
for the software fU7n.  The aim of  the prpject was to extend the application spectrum of 
computer aided simulation by new and further developments,  in order to open· up new 
markets and  further increase its know-how in this area. The initiative for the£.C project 
came from the 11Ulnagerofthe engineering bureau (see figure 3). The proj~ct idea was 
then developed  further, together with customers with whom the firm already had  personal 
contacts.  The partners had had certain problems in processing technology which could 
on[y be solved by more intensive development work. As the partners were also SI1Ulll and· 
medium sized  firms, they did not have the necessary financial resources and were on the 
look-out for public support.  Since the engineering bureau already had experience in 
project management it was given the project leadership. For two of  the four  partner  firms, 
this was the first EC-supported R&D project in which they·had participated. 
The technical and mathematical goals of  the EC project have already been achieved, 
although at the time of  our investigation onfy half  the project time had elapsed.  The 
computer aided simulations developed by the  engineering bureau  were  used by the. 
partner firms for testing purposes.  The results of  these  ~ests were then fed back to the 
engineering bureau,  which made_jurther improvements to the simulation programmes. 
By using the improved simulation programmes the partner  firms made substantial savings 
in time,  costs and materials,.· as well as improving the quality of  their manufactUring 
processes. 
As a result ·of the EC project,  the engineering bureau was able to develop a new 
software package which was alread_y being used by non-participants. In addition new 
physical data were gained,  extending and improving the data bank of  the engineering 
firm.  The engineering firm considered that the EC project has secured its competitive 
position, and it was able to use the proj'ect as a marketing instrument.  Without the EC 
support,  the project could not have been carried out in its present form or extent for 
reasons of  fmance;  it would only have been possible to tackle some of  the individual 
topics. 
68 3. Results_and Exploitation of  the EC R&D Projects 
An EC R&D project does not necessarily lead to a marketable product. It is useful to 
distinguish between results of an EC-sitpported project and exploitation of the results to 
identify the barriers of exploitation at this interface. The results aimed at in the 15 EC 
projects can be divided into technical results and other results (see figure 4). 
-1\vo general types of cases can be clearly distinguished within the 15 EC projects 
investigated: 
Case 1: 
The goal of the project is the joint development of a  demonstrator or prototype. These 
EC projects are precompetitive in character; economic impacts can only be detected 
several years after completion of the project. The participating firms make individual use 
of the ayquisitions of knowledge and experience for the development of new products, 
or for the internal introduction of  new processes. This firm-specific technical exploitation 
of the results achieved in the project may produce economic impacts after several years. 
Case 2: 
The, aim of the project is the closely application-related development of marketable 
products. These EC projects are no longer at the precompetitiye stage and economic 
impacts - if they occur - can be observed within a short time. The participating finns 
develop marketable products in close collaboration; these·are marketed by the developer 
and exploited in-house or by the user as a process innovation. These projects already 
produce improvements in the economic competitive position of the participating firms 
shortly after the end of the project, e.g. by the sale of new products and/or by reduction 
of costs in the manufacturing process. 
Apart from the technical and economic exploitation of the results, there have been 
additional benefits such as enhancement of the finn's scientific reputation, the building 
up of new cooperative relations, and participation in further EC projects. 
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the project results achieved and their (later) 
possible exploitation by the individual firms. 
69 3.l Results of  the EC R&D Projects 
The kind of results achieved are determined largely by the aims and content ~f  the EC 
projects being examined. If  the pre-planned goals are compared with the results actually 
.achieved, the following picture emerges: from the viewpoint of the firms in our study, 
.  product innovations were mainly being aimed-at which could be used as new process 
technologies  by future users.  Generally speaking,  the- more  application-oriented the 
content of the project, the closer to the market 'Yere the results actually achieved. 
Technical Results 
· All large companies investigated have developed a demonstrator, or in some cases a 
prototype, jointly with their partners. These targets were stipulated in the EC programmes 
and were fulfilled in the EC projects investigated. The purpose of the demonstrator is. to 
show technical feasibility, whereas the prototype already incorporates manufacturing and 
marketing aspects. A mOdular working method predominated here between the partners, 
i".e. the individual components were developed by the responsible partner in each case, 
and then assembled into a demonstrator or prototype. Often the prototype was only used 
within the project consortium. Only in two projects in which semi-finished products or 
_ new materials/new alloys were being developed were the prototypes sent for testing to 
potential customers outside the consortium. 
The  technical aim  of  one project investigated was  to develop  an advanced com-
munication system for the pn·vate market. In particular it was hoped to achieve communi-
cation compatibility between various types of  peripheral equipment (ISDN and analogue 
telephones,  work station,  PC,  multimedia  terminal,  etc.).  The  distribution  of work 
between the project  partners was as follows: the main contractor was responsible for the 
local switch unit in the area of  telecommunications and for the systems, and one partner 
was responsible for the fibre-based network and the data,  transfer,  while another dealt 
with resource management and call control. Three associates worked mainly on software 
and hardware specifications and an software implementation. The individual components 
were then assembled to form the demonstrator. 
In  other projects,  application-oriented  development and  direct conversion of the· 
results into marketable products was in the foreground. An example of the development 
of marketable products in cooperation with the partners in the consortium is provided by 
the three SM~.  The participating software companies and engineering bureaux imple-
mented customer-specific new methods, models and products with their partners, who 
had generally had a customer relationship with them before the project was launched. 
70 The  customer-speci(i~ solutions were  then  tested. by the  partners  and  improved  if 
necessary. The result of this interactive process between developer and user was optimi-
zation of existing products and the development of new products by the software firms. 
In  one project the major working areas  were  in  t~e problem  domain  of  inter-or-
ganizational business processes within logistics chains,  the required logistics applica-
tions  and integration  of the  underlying  technologies.  In  close  cooperation  between 
developers  and users several hardware and marketable software products  were  de-
veloped.  Software components  (in  most cases extensions to existing systems)  will be 
directly imbedded in a commercialenvironment and released for products. One software 
product had already been sold five times while the project was running. 
In four projects there was an input to.standardization bodies, even leading in one case 
to the introdJ.tction of a new nonn. The ~ain  reason for this input is that the projects, or 
parts of them, are concerned with new basic methods. 
The aim of  one project in the area of  automation technology was the development of 
specific integrated switches and the methodical description of  their function  in algo-
rithms. In the course of  the project the development of  the method camt; strongly into the 
foreground,  as it had been recognized that it fanned the basis for the hardware and 
· software solutions.  Thus substantiill method results  were achieved,  a~  many parts of 
them were subsequently incorporated into international norms. 
As well as these "direct" technical results there were several "indirect" technical results 
whose importance was differently assessed by the various participants: 
•  incre8$C in teclutological knowledge base, 
.  •  improvement in technical learning capability, 
~  publications in specialist journals· and/or books, 
•  presentation of the results at conferences/workshops. 
The indirect technical results (increase in technological knowledge base and improve-
ment leamil)g capability) were important for all participants questioned, as they form the 
basis for future  R&D  and improve the  ability  of employees to transfer  (acquired) 
technological know-how into new products/processes, an important factor in the success 
of R&D projects. 
Publications on the project results in the form of articles in specialist journals or books 
were seen by some of those questioned as being fmportant for the research workers 
involved in the project Firms used the publications as external presentation of the firm's 
tec~ological  competence, and as publicity for newly-developed products and processes. 
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 This "advertising"  use  ~lso applies to presentation of the results at conferences ·and 
workshops. 
Other Results 
The so-called "other results" such as increased experience in European cooperation· 
and experience in ·(international) project management were differently assessed by the 
project leaders. The importance is largely dependent upon whether the. participants or the 
cooperating  project workers  were  already experienced in carrying out  international 
projects. Since 'large companies in particular have experience of project management and 
international cooperations, they tended to assess these other. results as being relatively 
unimportant. However, increased experience of cooperation and project management at 
a European level plays a considerable role for first-time participants in EC projects. This 
.  . 
applied in the ·case· of large companies if the project under· investigation was their first 
EC supported project, and for-participating SMEs, whose experience in the management 
of international R&D cooperations tended to be  smaller~ 
3.2 Exploitation of  the results 
In accordance  with  the  aims  of  this element  of  our study  we  investigated  the 
exploitation of the project results mainly within ~e  firms and the exploitation of the 
complete project results within the consortium only as far as necessary~ 
In  all cases investigated, the exploitation of project results was modular, i.e. the project 
results are being further developed and exploited by the partners individually. In none of 
the cases investigated were the results of the project marketed as a whole (as a "system") 
by the participating firms. This exploitation of results is generally regulated by contracts 
between the partners.  ·  -
The following different (orms of exploitation could be distinguished: 
•  technlcal exploitation, 
•  economic exploitation, 
•  other exploitation. 
As seen in figure 4, these types of exploitation are interlinked. Whereas technical 
exploitation is relatively easy to record, it was difficult to obtain concrete figures on 
economic exploitation. In some cases customers for the new products still have to be 
found; in others the products are components of other products, so that their share in  the 
turnover is not quantifiable. Moreover it was often not possible for the interviewees to 
ascribe savings or increases in turnover concretely to a specific cause. 
73 -If the projects were concerned with software development, the partners took on a user 
function, testing both  hardware and software products. The  marketing of  the new products 
remained the province of the developing finns - in one  _project the main contractor even 
sold a newly developed software package while the project was still running. These firms 
also made use of the knowledge acquired in this way to improve existing products. 
Technical exploitation by the partners took the form of internal use of luirdware and 
..  software in production processes. By  the introduction of  process innovations the  partners 
were able to cut their costs and/or improve their productivity. In these investigated 
projects the results were being exploited economically by all participating firms. 
'  In projects in which a prototYpe was developed, the further development/marketing 
of the components and/or their internal introduction as a process innovation were also 
left to the individual finns. 
In almost all the projects, one or more marketable products were developed by the 
large companies investigated. Only in three projects is the demonstratOr/prototype still 
at the testing stage. In two of these, however, possible products are expected· to be ready 
_  for the market within the next two years; in one, some parts of the project results have 
already been incorporated in other products. 
Often it is diffiCult to distinguish exactly between exploitation of results as a product 
innovation or a process innovation. 
For instance,  in  one EC project concerned· with  image processing and its use in 
robotics, a demonstration system was built up.  The prototype consisted of  three modules 
which  were developed independently of  one another.  The main  contractor,  who con-
tributed to two of  the modules,  used one module (grey image processing) in-house in 
another part of  the firm to improve existing manufacturing processes,  while the other 
(grey scale sensor) was directly incorporated as a component in another product. 
In five projects, process innovations were developed which were used in-house, i.e. 
within the finn or within the MNE, to improve existing manufacturing processes. These 
led to reduced costs and/or improved productivity, about which we only have concrete 
information in one case. This project is the only one of the 15 projects examined which 
was accompanied by a value analysis, thus documenting the project results and their 
exploitation. 
In  one  EC project we  investigated,  the  main  ·contractor and the  $Ubcontractors 
developed and tested more than 50 products arid  made use of  them  in the areas of 
production planning, quality assurance and servicing/maintenance or in other areas of 
manufacturing. Of  the 38 results of  this project included in a value analysis, 11% were 
general methods (standards),  45% were prototypes, 21% were being used internally as 
74 process innovations within the enterprise and 23% of  the results were able to be converted 
into marketable products.  Process innovations already installed while the project was 
running achieved savings of  2.4 million ECU in the first year. 
Patents were applied for in approximately one third of the projects studied,-but were 
not regarded by interviewees as an important indicator of the suc·cess of ~e  project. It 
should be noted that in the area of software the newly-developed programmes are not 
able to be protected under patent law~ 
Exploitation of the results by participating finns has not only been technical and 
economic; participation in EC projects and the added experience gained from them has 
led to other  pote~tial benefits, whose economic impacts cannot be assessed at the present 
time. 
In about half the E~  projects investigated they provided the basis for <;>ne  or more 
successor projects. These were (or are) sometimes canied out with the same partners and 
sometimes with new ones. In some instances, the EC project has also formed the basis 
for a subsequent cooperation between the main contractor and one or more of the partners. 
As already mentioned above, both publications and presentations at conferences and 
workshops were used by participating firms as a means of advertising. 
It is difficult to ·assess the extent to which experience gained in the projects in the 
management of international R&D cooperations, especially by the SMEs included in  our 
study, led to a general improvement in internal project management. In a few cases firms 
made use of the additional experience to offer (international) project management as a 
service. 
In none of the firms investigated was the technology strategy changed because of the 
project results. A  few firms changed their technology strategy due to a takeover by another 
enterprise-or due to a changed technological environment. 
3.3 Problems to Achieve Project Objectives and Barriers to 
Exploitation 
• 
·It is impartant to distinguish between the problems arising whilst project objectives 
· are being achieved and the barriers of exploitation. The first can occur during the running 
of the project and can have an impact on the achievement of project goals, e.g. technical 
problems  need  more  time  than  planned  or cooperation  problems  lead to  a project 
breaking-off. Due to our definition of results and exploitation the barriers to exploitation 
can only occur if project resUlts already exist. They can influence or even prevent the 
technical, economic and/or other exploitation of project results. 
75 In  five projects no problems have been identified and the technical aims were achieved. 
As mentioned above, the exploitation of project results' was modular and no exploitation 
barriers exist according to the interviewee. It is particularly worth noting that the three 
projects  conducted  by the SMEs  belonged  to this  group.  These projects could  be 
characterized as follows: 
•  the consortium was made up of developers and users, or of complemeRtary 
fUnn1s,  ' 
•  the partners were (technically) competent partners, 
•  the project was in an important business area for the firms, 
•  the individual sub-task.s to be performed were clearly defined and 
complementary in the consortium, 
•  project leadership was "tight" and disciplined. 
For  instance,  in  one  of the  investigated EC projects  with jive participants,  the 
interviewee ascribed the success of  the project to the following measures: project partners 
were chosen for both technical and competition policy reasons; a technically immature 
firm· would not be considered as a partner;  any more than a direct competitor.  The 
·individual modules and subsidiary goals were defined very preciselY beforehand, includ-
ing  their timing  and finance;  common aims ·Were  incorporated into  a higher-level 
framework and linked with thesub-SJ'Stems of  the partners. The sub-tasks of  the individual 
partners were clearlY defined and separated  The main contractor (project leader) was 
answerable on the one hand to the steering group of  the EC committee (made up of  EC 
representatives and other industrial firms) for economic procedure and project success, 
and on the other hand to a specialist committee of  project and sub-project managers 
regarding the specialist development of  the project. 
Problems to  ~chieve  Project Objectives 
In three of the projects investigated there were cooperation problems; however, -only 
in one case did these problems - emphasized by the attitude of the responsible EC 
representative -lead  to the project being broken off prematurely. In both !Qe other projects 
the technical aims were achieved an~  the main contractors developed and sold marketable 
products. 
Altogether there were technical problems in three projects. The technical goals being 
aimed at were not fulfilled during the runnirig of the project. This was not so much due 
to the technical feasibility aspect; either the procedure originally chosen proved to be too 
cost-intensive or not economically feasible, or the technical development proved more 
complex and thus more time-consuming than planned at the beginning of 'the project. 
76 • 
Barriers to Exploitation 
Changes  in organizational  structure and  changes in entrepreneurial strategy were 
identified as internal barriers to economic exploitation. The technical goals of the 
. project were achieved, but due to the_ changed internal circumstances the ·involved unit 
or firm could not exploit the project ~ts  in an economic way. 
For instance,  the firm  under investigation  was~  taken ove1;  with the result that the 
high-performance switch developed in the project was tested by another member of  the 
MNE and also put  to use there as the results were positive. The ultimate goal of  the project 
when it began had been to establish. the new process as afield of  business.  Howeve~; as 
the new parent MNE does not wish to open up any new  fields ofbusiness and thefun.ctioNJl 
field in  which  the project lay is losing importance within the MNE,  the interviewee 
suspects that the MNE will approach an external enterprise and offer to sell it the process  . 
The project was started under different conditions, and due to restructuring the aims of 
the relevant business unit have changed. Thus it should be noted that "the project· would 
no longer be possible, given the present aims aiuJ would no longer have been carried out 
today." 
External prevailing conditions such as general technological development or lack of 
customer demand can influence the exploitation of the project results. In a few cases the 
general technological development literally overtook the project and prevented a techni-
cal and/or economic exploitation. 
For instance, the lack of  technical success of  one of  the projects investigated could 
not have been foreseen with the know-how available at the time when the project was 
started.  This project was "overtaken" by software development.  The hardware solution 
being aimed at was never built, as the goals it was initially intended to pursue were now 
able to be achieved more cheaply using software. 
Lack of acceptance by potential customers, or lack of demand, caused in part by 
general technological developments, prevented market introduction of the developed, 
marketable products from taking place in two projects. The knowledge gained was not 
transferred into marketable products but tended to be "put away in a drawer". 
As seen above, these external barriers to exploitation influence respectively prevent 
an exploitation of the project results in a technical and/or economic way. The question 
of how  helpful  market  forecasts  or technology forecasting  instruments could be  in 
assessing future market potentials and technological developments was not examined. 
.  -
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4. The Role of  the EC 
In  order to assess the impact of EC supported projects on technology transfer of firms 
it has to be taken into account that 12 of our R&D establishments investigated belonged 
to MNE. For these companies EC funding only. plays a minor  part~  financing their R&D 
activities and can be considered as a "drop in  the ocean". For instance. a MNE located in 
Germany funded nearly all of its R&D expenditure internally; publicly supported R&D 
by Bonn .and Brussels amounted to barely 3% of the total R&D expenditure in 1990. 
The selection and controlling of the projects by the EC is based mainly on project 
related criteria and not on one firm's specjfic criteria. The applicant must prove his 
scientific qualifications and the ability to manage a project in EC dimensions. Therefore 
in the projects investigated, no factors on the part of the EC could be identified which 
influenced internal technology transfer. If  the EC were to want to exert any influence on 
this aspect, it would have to stipulate when awarding EC projects how the project should 
be organi~  internally, and what functional groups should participate. 
We could not ascertain any impacts of the EC support on the internal R&D manage-
ment of films in the projects we investigated. If need be - and in a few cases only - the 
participation in an EC project improves the ability, especially of the project leaders, to 
manage European cooperation R&D projects. This basically only affects firms which are 
cooperating _for the first time at a European level and have to find partners from other 
countries. These  finns~  especially SMEs, have to familiarize themselves with the require-
ments of European project management. 
In SC>me of the projects investigated, the EC influenced the choice of panners. This 
did not generally affect the project as a whole but only individual partners. These consortia 
assem"led for "policy reasons" were judged with scepticism by the main contractors, who 
considered that the "political" partners lacked the technological competence and man-
agement capabilities necessary to participate in R&D projects of this kind. 
In almost all cases the interviewees aiticized the administrative demands of EC 
projects.  Especially SMEs with their limited number of employees and financial. re-
sources have problems to finance the procedure of application, which needs, including 
the seeking and choosing of suitable partners, up to 3 months. Some intervie·wees, even 
managers of MNEs, said that the expenditure was out of all proportion to the achieved 
results: "EC projects are a subsidi_zed business." 
The great importance of the EC in this respect lies in its support of· EUropean R&D 
cooperation on the strategic level of the enterprises and in its financial support of R&D 
projects on the tactical (executive) level of the enterprises. In our study, three projects 
would have been canied out without the EC support; this was a pure "free rider" effect. 
In  the rest of the projects, the EC fulfilled a necessary financing function. In  these cases, 
according to statements by the interviewees, the projects would not liave been carried out 
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in their final extensive form without EC support. Especially in the case of  the three SMEs, 
whose partners in the projects were also mainly small and medium sized firms, the 
projects could not have carried out without support, due to limited research and devel-
opment budgets. 
I 
! 
S.Summary 
In approximately half the EC projects examined, the ideas came from the R&D unit 
in which the EC project was subsequently performed. The projects were clearly tech-
nology-pushed and were based on technology lines already present in the R&D laboratory 
or the R&D departn!lent of the business unit. The process of idea gener:ation in the EC 
projects carried out by the three small and medium sized software fnms, on. the other 
hand, was quite different. These SMEs placed a high value on the generation of ideas; 
nevertheless the project idea was discussed at an early stage with the customer, with whom 
· the firm  was already in contact Thus the project idea was developed in interaction 
between software developers and userS. In these three EC projects, both the developer 
, and the user were subsequently represented in the consortium. 
One project was discontinued in  an early stage.  In almost  all  the other projects 
investigated, one or more marketable products as well as new or improved processes were 
developed by the enterprises. Only in three projects the demonstrator/prototype was still 
at the testing stage. In two of these, however, possible products are eXpected to be ready 
for the market within the next two years; in one, some parts of the project results have 
already been incorporated in other products. 
In all cases investigated, ~~  exploitation of project results was ·modular: The project 
results were being further developed and exploited by the partners individually. In none 
of the cases were the results of the project marketed as a whole ("as a system") by the· 
participating firms. 
Exploitation of the results by participating firms had not only been technical and 
economic; participation in EC projects and the added experience gained from them has 
led to other potential benefits. In about half the projects the basis was provided for one 
or more successor projects. These were (or are)  sometimes,carried out with the same 
partners and sometimes with new ones. In some instances, the EC project had also formed 
the basis for a subsequent cooperation between the main contractor and one or more of 
the partners. 
It is difficult to assess the extent to which experience gained in the management of 
international R&D cooperations, especially by the SMEs included in our study, led to a 
general improvement in internal project management. From the view of the interviews 
there was no impact of the EC projects on the internal management or organizational 
79 structure of the enterprise. 
A few firms made use of  the gained experience as a project leader of  the EC consortium 
and offered project manag~t  as a service for other enterprises to manage cross-border 
projects.  , 
The R&D projects supported by Brussels served as a catalyst for the cooperation of 
the large companies with other European finns.  However,  for these companies  EC 
funding only played a minor-part in  financing their R&D activities. The large companies 
only applied· for EC projects if they suited their. technology strategy and· their R&D 
portfolio. For these reasons the EC support could not generate new ideas and had less (or 
no) impact on the technology trailsfer process within the firms. 
In  the case of  the three SMEs we found that there existed "European oriented business 
networks" which shaped the basis for "European oriented R&D l)etworks". Partners of 
these business networks applied for EC support as parts of existing networks. The EC 
projects encouraged these network-relationships on European level arid favoured the 
enlargement of  the businesS networks with R&D activities. 
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